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This dissertation focuses on how internal ideological dynamics and political theologies of 
religious institutions shape their articulations of political claims. It explores how the “success” of 
traditionalist claims can drive formal desecularization at the expense of triggering a liberal 
backlash. These issues are explored through an in-depth case study of the conflict that emerged 
in Spring of 2020 between fundamentalists, traditionalists, and liberals in the Georgian Orthodox 
Church and Orthodox scholarly community over the Holy Synod’s decision not to modify 
religious services despite the novel coronavirus pandemic and nationwide state of emergency. It 
finds that the GOC can be characterized as a traditionalist institution due to its tendency to 
privilege Orthodoxy over other religions, challenge the validity of secular knowledge, and 
articulate the exercise of religion in terms of human rights. The reasons behind these stances 
have also been explored. This thesis posits that this episode was caused primarily by a permissive 
attitude towards ideological division in the Church and an agreement between the traditionalist 
Patriarchate and fundamentalist segment of the Synod. The liberal critique of the Church’s 
political claims, which represent a minority political claim, is also explored through the public 
criticisms of theologians.  
 
Keywords: Orthodoxy, Traditionalism, Fundamentalism, Georgian Orthodox Church, Public 










Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Aims and Questions 
In the Spring of 2020, the Georgian Orthodox Church1 refused to close its doors despite 
the deadly coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent government declaration of a state of 
emergency. Before the virus had even started to spread domestically, Church officials stated in 
public that they would not modify the traditional communion ritual or consider closing churches. 
This put the government in the position of having to continually negotiate over several months 
with one of the country’s most powerful and respected institutions in a moment of acute fear 
and crisis. Although the Church and State eventually brokered an agreement, the numerous pleas 
of public health officials, claims by the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice that the state of 
emergency should also apply to the Church, and several meetings with Church officials 
demonstrated that the Church-State agreement over Easter was not a true compromise, but 
rather a Government concession before an intransigent Church. This period was marked by an 
explosion of commentary and debate about the public messaging role of clergy in times of 
emergency, what constitutes “social responsibility” on the part of secular and religious leaders, 
arguments over the constitutionality of the State potentially limiting religious gatherings, and 
individual exploration of the morality of attending, or choosing not to attend, services under 
pandemic conditions. 
 This episode demonstrated the political power of the Church and its ability to de facto 
dictate outcomes in conflicts with a weak state. The Church, in most estimations, understood 
this event as an opening for an articulation of political goals. Therefore, the research questions 
that guided this project were:  
1. To what extent was the conflict that emerged manufactured for political gain or 
genuinely rooted in theological challenges?    
2. When a window of opportunity emerged, what political claims did the Church make? 
3. What responses did this claim-making prompt from the public? 
In this work, I focus primarily on the Church’s articulation of political aims and the critical 
response that this triggered from within the Orthodox tradition. I endeavor to answer these 
questions by consulting media, analyzing the Church’s public statements, and conducting expert 
                                                          
1 In a brief terminological note, this dissertation will refer to the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of 
Georgia as the “Georgian Orthodox Church,” “the Church,” or the “GOC,” as this term is used more widely in area 




interviews. In the conclusion, I briefly address the impacts of this agreement and conflict on the 
general public and Church-State relations.  
 
1.2 Thesis Statements 
This dissertation puts forward two interrelated arguments about the causes and effects of 
this event. Firstly, this conflict between the Church and the State is attributable in large part to 
the current institutional structure of the Church and the Patriarchate’s permissive stance towards 
deep internal ideological divisions. This thesis argues that the three epistemic stances that typify 
traditionalist engagement – privileging Orthodoxy, challenging secular (in this case, scientific and 
medical) knowledge, and articulating the exercise of religion in terms of human rights – were all 
visible in the Patriarchate’s challenge to the State catalyzed by the Coronavirus. These 
traditionalist positions formed a successful bid for further formal desecularization, as the 
government ceded that the state of emergency could not constitutionally be applied to limit 
religious freedom and accommodated all of the demands of the Church. Secondly, the Church’s 
political statements and rhetorical methods of engagement contributed to the emergence of the 
Easter agreement as a site of post-secular conflict in Georgian society, prompting a liberal 
backlash. I focus on the critical responses to the State’s position and the Church’s claims, 
specifically from the community of independent theologians, who argue from within the 


















Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
This dissertation will use three main conceptual frameworks to approach these issues: the literatures on 
secularization and desecularization, Church-State relations in Orthodoxy, and the state of emergency. 
 
2.1 Public Religions and Religious Groups as Political Actors  
 In the 1960s and 70s, scholars of religion and sociologists developed a set of ideas that would 
later be called “secularization theory.” The fundamental premise of the theory was that, in industrialized 
democracies, religion would become increasingly differentiated from areas of life now defined by secular 
norms (the State, science, and the economy, to name a few domains), would have to settle into its own 
privatized realm, and would, eventually, lose its vitality. Jose Casanova offered a refinement of the theory, 
arguing that secularization was composed of three unintegrated processes: the differentiation of spheres, 
the decline of religious beliefs, and the privatization of religion. He came to this conclusion through a 
series of case studies demonstrating that, even when the differentiation phase of secularization does occur, 
religion does not necessarily cease to play a public role (Casanova 1994). Vyacheslav Karpov, observing 
the resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russian society in the 90s and 2000s, provided 
a further refinement through his articulation of desecularization. Following Casanova’s framework, 
Karpov conceptualizes desecularization as the rapprochement between formerly secularized institutions 
and religious norms, the resurgence of religious beliefs and practices, and the return of religion to the 
public sphere (Karpov 2010). This was particularly appropriate for the post-Soviet context, which had 
been secularized by force and had to, through policy, consciously choose to reinsert religion into public 
life. It is now more common to think of secularization and desecularization as a dynamic, dialogic, and 
reversible process rather than the original teleological bent of secularization theory.  
How religions engage a pluralistic public has, therefore, become the subject of many studies. In 
2006, philosopher Jurgen Habermas argued that, in order to be successful in public in the post-secular 
context, in which pluralism must be accepted as a norm, religious communities and citizens must develop 
what he called “epistemic stance[s] towards 
1) […] other religions and world views that they encounter within a universe of discourse 
hitherto occupied only by their own religion. They succeed to the degree that they self-reflexively 
relate their religious beliefs to the statements of competing doctrines of salvation in such a way 
that they do not endanger their own exclusive claim to truth. 
2) […] the independence of secular from sacred knowledge and the institutionalized monopoly of 
modern scientific experts. They can only succeed if from their religious viewpoint they conceive 
the relationship of dogmatic and secular beliefs in such a way that the autonomous progress in 
secular knowledge cannot come to contradict their faith. 
3) […] the priority that secular reasons enjoy in the political arena. This can succeed only to the 
extent that they convincingly connect the egalitarian individualism and universalism of modern 
law and morality with the premises of their comprehensive doctrines.” (Habermas 2006, 14) 
 
Habermas, therefore, imagines that if religious communities want to be public and exist in pluralistic 
liberal democracies, they must accept and, to some extent, embrace this plurality on the grounds that 
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others will extend the same tolerance towards difference to them, in turn. Kristina Stoeckl argues, 
however, that there is an often-overlooked intermediary between the two binary poles of Habermas’ 
idealized liberal religious communities and fundamentalists. She calls this group traditionalists. In her 
view, traditionalists self-consciously invert Habermas’ principles: 
1) “In debates on religious freedom and the visibility of religion in the public sphere, 
traditionalist actors often defend the privileged role and visibility of their religion at the expense 
of rights for minority religions or non-believers. They do so, however, not by publicly arguing 
that their belief is superior over the other, but by claiming that their belief is that of the majority. 
2) Most traditionalists do not dispute the independence of secular knowledge directly, but they 
advance claims that they borrow from the pluralism within scientific discourse, which questions 
the independence of knowledge and describes it as the product of power-structures. 
3) The third step is about reconciling religious doctrine ‘with the egalitarian individualism and 
universalism of modern law and morality’; i.e. it is about connecting religious doctrine and 
individual human rights in modern secular societies.” (Stoeckl 2016, 37) 
 
Claiming that all who choose not to engage in a liberal manner are fundamentalists is, in Stoeckl’s view, a 
significant and counterproductive oversight that obscures the complex dynamics of secularization and 
desecularization occurring in the majority of the Orthodox world. This dissertation will argue that these 
three stances that typify traditionalist engagement – privileging Orthodoxy, challenging secular (in this 
case, scientific and medical) knowledge, and articulating the exercise of religion in terms of human rights 
– were all visible in the Patriarchate’s challenge to the State catalyzed by the Coronavirus.  
Finally, it is necessary to discuss the other pole: fundamentalism. This dissertation uses the 
definition developed by the Fundamentalism Project, a five-volume series that brought together examples 
of fundamentalisms from various world religions to understand their commonalities. Appleby, one of the 
principal editors of the project, argued that fundamentalism has five main features:  
1. It reacts to the marginalization of religion;  
2. It is highly selective in the manner in which it engages with tradition and modernity;  
3. Fundamentalism is Manichean in its moral understanding of the world;  
4. Fundamentalists make absolutist claims;  
5. It is marked by the adoption of messianism and the belief that one community alone can save 
humankind (Appleby 2009).  
Therefore, fundamentalism is the extreme form of counter-secularization and produces an outlook on the 
world which is, at its core, impossible to reconcile with modern pluralistic societies without either 
recreating them in their own image or seeking complete isolation. Fundamentalism can take violent 
forms, but it is not necessarily so. 
 
2.2 Orthodox Church-State Relations: From Symphonia to Entanglements 
 The primary lens through which Orthodox Church-State relations is traditionally viewed is 
symphonia, a political theology first articulated in the Byzantine Empire. The Greek term symphonia, 
meaning “accord” or “agreement,” was used in pre-Christian medical texts to denote a state of balance 
between the various humors in a human body. One of the earliest examples of non-medical usage was 
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Eusebius of Caesarea (263-339 BCE) applied the term widely when referring to concord or balance. 
Symphonia acquired a political dimension in the Byzantine era (Hovorun 2017, 282). In contemporary 
usage, however, it denotes a formal separation of the State and the Church, but in which the two 
institutions enjoy one another’s support and share the goal of ensuring the physical and spiritual welfare 
of a country’s population. This is, notably, not a description of the actual state of affairs during the 
Byzantine era, but rather a prescription for an ideal formulation that would maximize human flourishing 
through alignment of the worldly (profane) and holy (divine) hierarchies in what the Geanakoplos 
characterized as “an imitation of the divine order in heaven” (Geanakoplos 382). It can alternatively be 
understood as a covenant with God ensured by those in power on Earth. 
 However, the lack of a practical definition or set of concrete guidelines for the concept’s 
application has permitted widely divergent interpretations of symphonia by political and ecclesiastical 
leadership (Jianu 2020). As Cyril Hovorun characterizes it: “the church and state merged for the majority 
of the Byzantines into a single theopolitical entity” (Hovorun 2017, 289). He further elucidates how this 
arrangement entailed significant governmental oversight over matters of religious doctrine. In the Balkan 
context, the extensive powers enjoyed by Orthodox Churches today did not come about until the 
establishment of the Ottoman millet system, in which the Patriarch served as a representative of the 
Eastern Orthodox Christian minority population. Hovorun further assesses that, following the experience 
of the separation of Church and State (the differentiation phase of secularization), “no single model of 
symphony from premodern times would satisfy the [contemporary] churches” (Hovorun 2017, 296). 
Many primates and politicians in majority-Orthodox countries claim that symphony is a guiding principle 
for Church-State relations to this day or have sought to revive what they understand as elements of this 
principle.2 Given that the Orthodox world was never unified under a single government, and 
autocephalous churches generally regard themselves as “the historic repository of nationhood, national 
values, and quite often, as the savior of a nation’s very existence” (Radu 1998), voices that call for the 
implementation of symphonic ideals in Russia, Romania, and Georgia, for example, are reaching into very 
different idealized pasts. While perhaps influenced by transnational dialogue within the broader Eastern 
Orthodox community, Church and State leaders articulated historical models of symphonia in distinct ways 
on a local basis, and understandings of the term’s implications have been handed down through 
linguistically discrete religious and philosophical traditions (Roudometof 2013).3 
                                                          
2 This idea is most openly endorsed in the modern day by the Russian Orthodox Church. Both politicians and 
church leadership focused on symphonia at Patriarch Kirill’s enthronement in Moscow in 2009 (Grdzelidze 2010, 
163). 
3 Contemporary thinkers from within the church tend to frame these dynamics in prescriptive terms. Symphonia is 
often described in a metaphorical sense as, for example, a functioning body (the State) that is animated by the soul 
(the Church), leading to spiritually and politically healthy habits in the population. It is also common in Orthodox 
thinking to present analytical models for politics rooted in symbolism from religious doctrine. For example, 
Kakhaber Kurtanidze, a Georgian Orthodox priest and academic, has proposed a “trinitarian” model for 
understanding Church-State relations, a triad of “State-Church-Society,” marked by peaceful coexistence and mutual 
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Despite its importance in the historical legacy and study of Eastern Orthodoxy, symphonia is an 
ambiguous and analytically challenging concept to approach. It is often misinterpreted by journalists and 
non-theologians alike as a state of permanent agreement or concord between Church and State. It is 
better to describe symphonia as a normative concept or ideological stance, which makes it, by definition, 
vague. In practice, efforts to fuse Church and State goals have always entailed a great deal of conflict. To 
address this issue, Koellner proposes analyzing Church-State relations through “entanglements” as 
opposed to symphonia. He roughly categorizes entanglements as existing on the “personal, ideological, and 
institutional” levels. Personal entanglements are close relationships between ecclesiastical and political 
elites. Ideological entanglement is a convergence of worldviews or a set of shared values between Church 
and State actors. Finally, institutional entanglement refers to the formal legal agreements between the 
Church and the State (Koellner 2020, 8). After assessing the literature and interviewing theologians for 
this project, this dissertation rejects the use of the historically amorphous notion of symphonia as an 
analytical tool and instead tries to conceive of ties between religions and States as entanglements. This 
allows observers to disambiguate the specific mechanisms of mutual influence involved in contemporary 
Church-State relations and simplifies cross-denominational comparison.  
Demonstrating multi-level and deep entanglements has proven to be very important to State and 
Church actors in Georgia. The Church is deeply entangled with the State on an institutional level (see 
section 4.2). Politicians also strive to perform intimacy with Church figures by, for example, individually 
visiting the Patriarch and hosting clergy at election events. They also perform ideological consonance 
through highly publicized manifestations of personal piety and speeches which reinforce the State’s 
support of the Church. To this repertoire of official engagement, one can also add what Stoeckl refers to 
as the “hybrid” dimension of Church-State relations (Stoeckl 2018). She discusses how the ROC interacts 
with the State through selective cooperation, seeking the status of a State Church, and, sometimes, 
disassociation. Hybridity entails the Church being able to operate to present its views and achieve its 
political goals at several levels simultaneously, both in public and behind closed doors, or through the 
cooption or cooperation with external actors. 
 
2.3 State of Emergency 
Many observers have highlighted that the suspension of rights and norms resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic qualifies as a “State of Exception,” a specific condition when the 
standard order is placed on hold, usually under the auspices of emergency powers, due to a crisis 
that may threaten the State and the Constitution (Hussain 2020; Andronikashvili 2020a; Nunes 
2020). This removal of administrative and legislative barriers empowers the primary leader in a 
                                                          
reinforcement. He advocates for this model as an analytical tool because it is explicitly non-secular and centers what 
he understands to be collective understandings of ritual and symbols (Kurtanidze 2011).  
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country to rule by decree. Rousseau traces the history of this practice back to Roman Law, 
arguing that emergency powers can allow governments to weather periods of acute crisis more 
successfully, provided that this “dictatorship” is both temporary and revocable (Rousseau 1923, 
bk. IV, chapter VI). In most modern countries, this need is anticipated in the constitution, which 
establishes how the state of emergency may be triggered.4  
States of exception, by their definition, open a chasm of vulnerability:  the population is 
at greater risk because many of their typical rights are suspended, and the Constitution is at 
greater risk because checks and balances that typically limit abuses of power are removed. Carl 
Schmitt famously defined the Sovereign in a country as the person who is empowered to “decide 
what is an exception and to make the decision appropriate to the exception”(Schmitt 1985, 13). 
Although Schmitt wrote primarily on the question of national sovereignty, in the present case, a 
combination of supranational regulations and local articulations thereof drove governments to 
take extreme measures limiting the citizen’s personal freedoms to protect them. In their case 
study focusing on the WHO’s response to the SARS crisis, Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen argue 
that an “emergency trap” is triggered by discretionary declarations of health emergencies made 
by international organizations (IOs). These cause securitization on the national level, including 
declarations of a state of emergency in cases where the epidemiological situation might not 
wholly justify such severe measures. The authors thus advocate for constitutional “containment” 
of the emergency powers of IO’s on the national level (Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). 
The response to the transnational threat of the novel Coronavirus fits into this paradigm – many 
countries submitted to economically damaging and limiting lockdowns due simply to a lack of 
reliable information. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper is to question the proportionality of the measures 
taken in the Republic of Georgia to the threat posed by the virus. That will not be known for 
years. However, the state of emergency should be understood as one of the most extreme tools 
in a government’s arsenal to demand compliance from institutions and individual citizens. The 
state of emergency had only been triggered once before in recent Georgian history.5 By 
challenging public health officials, the GOC was de facto entering into a debate over the 
appropriateness of the measures taken, and it appeared as though the leadership of a single 
                                                          
4 In the Republic of Georgia, the Parliament can approve a state of emergency in response to “war, mass riot, 
infringement upon territorial integrity of the country, military coup d’état, armed rebellion, ecological catastrophe, 
epidemic, natural calamity, gross breakdown, epizootic, and in other circumstances where the public authorities are 
not able to normally exercise their constitutional powers” (“Law of Georgia: On the State of Emergency” 1997). 
5 Saakashvili called a state of emergency in 2007 in response to mass anti-government protests in Tbilisi.  
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religious community was able to dictate policy through refusal to bend to external pressures. This 
was a local version of one of the most significant issues that emerged at this moment globally – 































3. Methodology and Methods 
 
3.1 Methodological Approach 
As the events of the Spring of 2020 were unfolding, I elected to conduct a qualitative 
case study of the Easter conflict in the Republic of Georgia. This research highlights the 
challenges of approaching socio-political problems in real-time: the events drew me in before I 
understood the angle I intended to approach them from or what this was a case of. Therefore, I 
began this project by casting with a wide net and tried to use inductive field research to 
investigate the research problems from a number of different angles. This distinctly non-linear 
process involved oscillating between data-gathering, consulting different historical and 
theoretical directions, and returning back to the data. This process has defined how I approached 
the case (Lund 2014). Although it is a risky choice for a novice researcher, given the evolving 
situation and the lack of modern historical analogs, an exploratory approach seemed to be the 
most appropriate option for the episode at hand. 
This essay draws inspiration from the work of Kristina Stoeckl, Dmitri Uzlaner, and 
Alexander Agadjanian under the auspices of the Postsecular Conflicts project, which analyzes, 
broadly speaking, contemporary religious-moral conflicts, primarily using the case of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Stoeckl addresses these questions through a disciplinary approach that she 
calls the political sociology of religions, which emphasizes bringing sociological methodologies in 
conversation with comparative politics (Stoeckl 2018, 222–23). Therefore, primarily through 
discourse analysis and case studies, these projects analyze the ROC as a political actor 
domestically and dissect how the institution articulates its political goals and moral visions 
internationally through transnational conservative networks. As I was interested in understanding 
the internal pressures behind, ideological significance of, and techniques through which religious 
actors express themselves politically, I elected to use a similar approach. This dissertation 
represents a lateral application of concepts developed in the Postsecular Conflicts project. It 
contributes to the field by using ideas formulated through empirical studies of the ROC, in the 
analysis of a different Orthodox community, and one which has an ambivalent and complex 
relationship to the ROC (Batiashvili 2020). 
Several scholars working on Georgia have successfully conducted sociological qualitative 
case studies of particularly illustrative and symbolically meaningful episodes of collision between 
the Church and the State. These include, for example, Barbare Janelidze’s characterization of the 
relationship between the United National Movement (UNM) and the Church, which she 
explored using the case of the conflict that emerged in 2011 over the adoption of a new law on 
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the legal registration of minority religious (Janelidze 2014). Another example was Michael Long’s 
analysis of the politics of monument restoration in Georgia, which utilized the case of the 
reconstruction of Bagrati Cathedral (Long 2017). The latter two focus primarily on Church-State 
relations, although they treat the Church as an independent political actor. Small-n comparisons 
of the rhetorical discursive strategies of different Churches are also very fruitful. For example, 
Shota Kakabadze and Andrey Makarychev’s analysis of how the Orthodox Churches of Georgia 
and Russia interact and engage with Europe is a particularly illustrative example of this type of 
study (Kakabadze and Makarychev 2018). While a small-n comparative approach may have been 
appropriate in this case, I elected to focus on a single case to present it in greater detail and with 
richer contextual information. One of the powerful results of this type of single study or very 
small-n analysis is that it allows the researcher to explore the external impacts of phenomena 
typically regarded as internal to religious communities or ignored entirely (for example, 
participation in ecumenical movements).  
 
3.2 Methods and Data Sources 
I elected to use a mixed-methods approach for this project. To understand the views of 
the Church and its critics, I surveyed media coverage, conducted discourse analysis on the 
official statements of the Patriarch and his press corps, and also held four in-depth interviews 
with theologians and members of the scholarly community. To simplify the isolation of themes 
across diverse data sources, I used NVivo software. This spread of sources allows me to present 
the contours of the Easter conflict as different parties understood it.  
 
3.2.A. Media Coverage 
To find interview subjects and develop a case timeline, analyzed and coded all coverage 
about Church-State relations in eight online news sources, including five based in Georgia and 
three covering the larger Caucasus region. Articles consulted extended from February through 
mid-June 2020. This includes the appearance of the first case of COVID-19 within Georgia’s 
borders and extends beyond the end of the national state of emergency on May 21st. They were 
selected by manually going through the archives of all news from this period on the website. I 
double-checked and added to this selection using keyword searches of the terms “church,” 
“religion.” “Patriarch,” “priest,” “spoon,” “coronavirus,” and “emergency” in the language of the site. The 
news sites utilized included daily coverage and opinion commentary from: 
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-JAM News,6 OC Media,7 EurasiaNet,8 and Interpress News Georgia9 in English;  
-Ekho Kavkaza10 and Kavkazsky Uzel11in Russian; 
-NetGazeti,12 and the “Verbatim” section of the online magazine Tabula13 in Georgian 
Where necessary, I consulted coverage from other sources like Civil GE and On.Ge to gather 
more context. Many of these articles included similar quotes and stories taken from television 
appearances of priests and government officials. Given the diversity and polarization that marks 
the Georgian media landscape, I deliberately sought news sources representing different sides of 
the political spectrum for this analysis. In total, approximately 750 web pages were analyzed.  
 
3.2.B. Patriarchate Statements 
To understand the positions of the Church, I systematically analyzed all statements and 
news releases on the official website of the Patriarchate published between February and June of 
2020. The institution’s output was 24 documents during this period, including letters from the 
Patriarch to the population, published sermons, Decisions of the Holy Synod, and Statements 
from the Patriarchate’s press corps. Two publications were not relevant to the present case and 
were excluded from analysis but still included in the data set. 
 
3.2.C. Semi-Structured Expert Interviews 
Interviews were conducted through Zoom calls in English and then transcribed and 
analyzed. Four interviewees were selected for their topical expertise:  
                                                          
6 JAMNews is a Georgia-based online news site published in five languages (Georgian, English, Russian, Armenian, 
and Azerbaijani) that is relatively centrist. They provide news coverage and analysis with a particular focus on 
reducing cross-border conflict in the Caucasus. 
7 OC Media is an independent, Tbilisi-based, left-leaning online news site published in English and Russian. 
8 Eurasianet is a non-profit independent news organization based at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. 
9 Interpress News is part of the Palitra Media group, which has existed since the 90s. Palitra is the largest group of 
news organizations in the country, and its owners are related to former Minister of the Economy and Sustainable 
Development under Georgian Dream, Dimitri Kumsishvili. 
10 “Echo of the Caucasus” is an outlet of Radio Liberty, funded by the United States government.   
11 “The Caucasian Knot” was founded as a project of the Memorial NGO in the Russian Federation. 
12 Netgazeti is the national edition of the independent newspaper Batumelebi, which is based in the region of Ajara. 
Batumelebi and Netgazeti are both critical of the government. 
13 “Verbatim” republishes quotes and commentaries from prominent individuals in the Georgian political 
landscape, endeavoring to put forward a range of opinions on a single topic. Tabula is a magazine founded by 
libertarian businesspeople with an explicitly pro-Western orientation. 
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-Levan Abashidze, a theologian and member of the analytical research group under the 
Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church. Due to his proximity to the institution, 
Abashidze is frequently invited to discuss and contextualize the Patriarchate’s decisions 
in Georgian media. 
-Zaal Andronikashvili, a literary studies scholar who has written extensively on the 
cultural history of Georgia and the Black Sea region. Andronikashvili is currently 
publishing a book of original research about the structural transformations of the 
institution of the Patriarchate and the Georgian Orthodox Church over the past century. 
- Tamara Grdzelidze, a theologian, is known for her work on the history of the GOC, 
ecumenism and Orthodoxy, and various issues relating to theology. She spent over a 
decade working at the World Council of Churches in interfaith dialogue and was 
appointed as the Ambassador to the Holy See from Georgia in 2014.  
-Interviewee 4 is a religious studies scholar from a university in Tbilisi specializing in 
popular religion and Church-State relations in contemporary Georgia. This individual 
preferred to remain anonymous. 
All of the individuals listed above were chosen because they conduct research on and, in some 
cases, with the GOC or had written public statements about this episode. Although their insights 
and explanations were solicited to provide context to the case at hand, the former three were 
also participants in the societal discussions that erupted over these issues. Those who study a 
specific subject in depth are typically wont to share their expertise with the general public where 
it is relevant, and the emotionally and politically charged nature of the topics at hand was 
omnipresent in these discussions. Some interviewees shared that they are Orthodox believers and 
discussed their personal feelings and actions over the Easter conflict. I endeavored to make a 
safe and comfortable environment for interviewees, informing them that their participation is 
voluntary. Although the School Ethics Forum at the University of Glasgow initially only 
approved of conducting interviews on the condition of anonymity, several interviewees 
requested that they be named, which led me to reapply for ethical approval. Therefore, I offered 
interviewees the opportunity to be either identified publicly or anonymized and explained that 
they could withdraw consent to use interview data at any time. Please see Appendices III and IV 
for a copy of the Plain Language Statement given to interviewees and a list of topics discussed.  
I also expect that participants’ views on the relative success or failure of the Church-State 
agreement, and governmental policy in the earliest days of the pandemic, more broadly, were 
influenced by the situation on the ground when I conducted interviews. Interviews took place in 
the Winter of 2020, amid the second wave of the virus in Georgia and after hotly contested 
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parliamentary elections in October, in which the Georgian Dream party claimed a majority of 




One of the most significant potential pitfalls of analyzing Church-State relations during a 
pandemic and state of emergency is that this period is, by its very definition, extraordinary. How 
accurate can a momentary snapshot assessment of a dynamic relationship be? In response to this 
question, I would emphasize that, at the time of writing, it appears likely even in optimistic 
scenarios that periodic mandatory lockdowns will be a feature of government policy until 2022. 
Therefore, the determination that religions are not subject to the law on the state of emergency is 
still relevant for the immediate present. In addition, analyzing how and why institutions dissent 
during public health emergencies may provide some insight into approaches that governments 
can take in the future to mitigate risk. Moreover, religious groups are often politically powerful 
and culturally significant institutions. The actions of leadership, be they secular or religious, carry 
great symbolic weight precisely during moments of crisis. 
Space was also a limiting factor. While this type of project may have been more 
productive from a regional perspective if it were designed as a small-n comparison between two 
or three countries, it became clear that Religion-State interactions tend to be some of the most 
specific, heterogeneous, and contextually bounded forms of statecraft. The political goals of 
religious institutions are very dependent on local conditions and the type of government that 
they are engaging with. Even within the subset of post-Soviet majority Orthodox states, the 
dynamics of Church-State relations differ radically across countries.  
Thirdly, this project relies solely on online text-based online news sources. This decision 
was made for language reasons and due to a lack of access to regularly aired television content. 
Georgia’s media landscape is deeply polarized along party fault lines patterns of individualized 
news consumption. While social networks, and Facebook, in particular, seem nearly ubiquitous 
in Georgia (Statista Research Department 2021) and the majority of households have access to a 
smartphone and a color TV as of 2020, it is still true that the choice to focus on online news sites 
will skew data towards what was viewed by younger, wealthier, city-dwelling Georgians. 
Meanwhile, those who are older, less socioeconomically advantaged, and from rural areas rely 
more on the television and radio for news (“Freedom on the Net 2020: Georgia” 2020). 
Finally, I am limited by my language abilities. I speak English natively, Russian fluently, 
and Georgian at an elementary level. Some sources were only available in Georgian. Where 
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necessary, I have relied on machine translation and checked my interpretations and renderings 




Although there has been much turnover in the Prime Ministerial position, which formally 
regulates the State’s relations with religious organizations, the Georgian Dream party had, in the 
Spring of 2020, been in power for almost eight years. This thesis represents a modest and 
preliminary attempt to document a historical event and analyze the behavior of the Church and 
the State during this period. As one of many studies on these episodes of conflict, this will 
hopefully provide some insight into how this era will be understood in the future.  
Moreover, this moment is also a particularly vulnerable one for the Church. Patriarch Ilia 
II is the longest-serving head of the Church in its entire history. The deep respect that he 
commands is unparalleled, and the question of how Church leadership will manage the 
ideological divides among the clergy without him remains to be answered.  
In this study, I have attempted to combine theoretical approaches from different fields – 
sociology, law, political science, and religious studies – to analyze the Church as a political actor. 
I was intrigued by the opportunity to write about a kind of natural experiment or bellwether case 
unfurling in real-time, in which different autocephalous Orthodox Churches simultaneously 
grappled with the same challenge but yielded very different results. The Georgian Church is an 
interesting case because its internal dynamics are rarely examined in connection to broader 
ideological trends in Orthodoxy. The contemporary nature of the subject matter will certainly 
influence the results of this study. Indeed, the virus is still spreading rapidly throughout the 
















Chapter 4. Contextual Information  
 
4.1 Brief History of Georgia and the Georgian Orthodox Church 
In this section, three distinct yet intertwining threads are presented in one continuous 
narrative: the histories of Georgian statehood, the Georgian Orthodox Church, and 
contemporary Georgian nationalism. I do not argue for a specifically religious reading of 
Georgian history but hope to elucidate how the Church and the State developed side-by-side 
over centuries. Rather than providing an exhaustive overview, the narrative focuses on moments 
that have become cultural touchstones, or otherwise usable pasts, in contemporary national 
history writing and nationalist discourse. 
 
4.1.A The Adoption of Christianity and Establishment of the Bagrationi Dynasty (300 – 
1800 CE) 
Georgia’s territory today roughly corresponds to the ancient polities of Svaneti, 
Colchis/Lazica (1200 – 164 BCE), and Kartli/Iberia (302 BCE – 580 AD) combined. In the first 
quarter of the fourth century CE, King Mirian III officially adopted Christianity as the state 
religion of Kartli/Iberia, following the teachings of St. Nino, a missionary from Cappadocia. 
Although the exact origins of the Georgian alphabet are a matter of historical and linguistic 
debate, the earliest known inscriptions in the language date back to the fifth century CE, and it is 
widely accepted that the script was developed to translate the Bible into Georgian (Rayfield 2013, 
38–41). Thus, both the history of the Georgian language and the written historical record of 
Georgia are inseparable from the Orthodox Church. Much of the lexical wealth of Georgia’s 
literary tradition developed in correspondence with Greek and through the translation of 
religious texts (Doborjginidze 2014). Although the Eastern Georgian Orthodox Church was 
autocephalous, or self-governing, as early as the sixth century, the Western part of the country, 
the Byzantine province of Lazica, was under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate in 
Constantinople. Priests in the latter region conducted services in Greek until the early eleventh 
century, when King Bagrat III unified the two territories. The ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church expanded along with the State’s political boundaries, and in 1010, 
Melkisedek I became the first Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia.  
This consolidation ushered in the “Golden Age” of the Kingdom of Georgia. This 
period saw the reigns of King David the Builder and Queen Tamar, both representatives of the 
Bagrationi dynasty. During this era, many of the most significant centers of Georgian 
Christianity, such as the Svetitskhoveli Cathedral in Mtskheta and the Gelati Monastery complex, 
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were either constructed or greatly expanded. The legitimacy of the Bagatrioni dynasty, which 
extended until the end of the eighteenth century, was rooted in medieval political theology, based 
on the Church’s support of a consecrated monarch (Maisuradze and Andronikashvili 2010). 
David the Builder, notably, established the position of the mtsignobartukhutses-chkondideli, a type of 
vizier or proto-prime ministerial role typically filled by an archpriest of the Orthodox Church. 
This non-hereditary position incorporated ecclesiastical leadership into the State’s decision-
making processes. It also helped centralize power in a political climate marked by a sizeable 
landed noble class who often joined forces with local priests to challenge the crown’s authority 
(Suny 1994, 34–35). 
Following this period, the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia operated 
continuously and independently throughout the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century and 
hundreds of years of rule by non-Christian empires, including the Mongols, Ottomans, and 
Safavid Persians. Despite not having political independence and being under various Muslim 
leaders, most Georgians maintained a Christian identity.14 The administrative structure of these 
empires and the religious educational system meant that the Orthodox Church became the 
primary repository of Georgian literary and artistic production in transnational and multi-ethnic 
imperial contexts.  
 
4.1.B Russian Annexation and Early Nationalist Projects  
After the Russian Empire annexed Georgia, Tsarist authorities spent the first half of the 
19th century endeavoring to bureaucratically, economically, and socially integrate the territory into 
the fold of their empire. Despite having promised not to do so, Russian authorities abolished the 
Georgian monarchy and dissolved the autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church, 
incorporating it into the Russian Orthodox Church. The justification for this action was that the 
Russian Empire did not formally distinguish between ethnic groups and categorized their diverse 
subjects primarily based on religion. During this time, priests performed the liturgy in Old 
Church Slavonic instead of Georgian, and several medieval Georgian churches and icons were 
repainted in the Russian style (Iagorashvili 2019). Although the various independent Eastern 
Orthodox Churches share foundational beliefs, the abolition of autocephaly is, in contemporary 
                                                          
14 The notable exception to this is the Black Sea region of Ajara, which was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire 
in the seventeenth century. Over the next two hundred years, many Ajarans converted to Islam, which has resulted 
in a significant Georgian Muslim minority residing near the Turkish border. 
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historiographical discourse, regarded as an extension of colonial power and a particularly 
grievous insult to the Georgian Orthodox Church.15  
The first modern nationalist project in Georgia was initiated by the tergdaleulebi, or “those 
who have drunk from the Tergi/Terek River,” which physically marked the boundary between 
Georgia and Russia. This generation of hereditarily noble Georgian intellectuals was born during 
the 1830s and gained exposure to Western European enlightenment and nationalist ideals 
through their university education in St. Petersburg. Bristling at the supposed backwardness of 
their nation in the eyes of Russian administrative elites, the tergdaleulebi sought a positive, 
unifying, and modern cultural identity for Georgians and established projects to promote 
education in their own language and to prevent cultural Russification.  
Georgian writer and nationalist Ilia Chavchavadze spearheaded this effort in the urban 
areas of the country. He is credited with the most succinct and oft-quoted definition of 
Georgianness: mamuli (“fatherland” or “territory”), ena (“language”), and sartsmuneoba (“faith”) 
(Mikaberidze 2015, 284). As Nodia explains, this list was not intended as an all-encompassing 
formula at the time of writing but was, instead, a commentary on the translation of a poem. This 
triad was lifted from its original context in the 1980s and associated with the growing nationalist 
sentiment of the late Soviet era (Nodia 2009, 88). There is significant evidence that the 
tergdaleulebi had a complex relationship with Christianity and that their nationalism was neither 
explicitly religious nor exclusionary on the basis of religion. Reisner emphasizes the impact that 
secular education had on this generation, stating that the “Georgian Orthodox religion, which 
provided the basic assumptions upon which their social and political institutions had been 
founded for centuries, now ceased to play its legitimizing role.” (Reisner 2009, 40). Moreover, 
although the “faith” in this formulation is typically understood to be Orthodox Christianity, it is 
important to note that Chavchavadze explicitly supported the inclusion of Muslim Ajarans into 
the Georgian national project, even advocating for the application of sharia law in some contexts 
(Pelkmans 2006, 99).  
It can be surmised that the tergdaleulebi regarded the Church as an important historical 
organizing structure or lieu de memoire for Georgians. This view is bolstered by Manning, who 
discusses the prevalence of imagery of the ruins of medieval Georgian Orthodox Churches and 
monasteries in nineteenth-century Georgian literature, charting their transition from an object of 
                                                          
15 See, for example, Zurab Kutateladze’s account of the history of the Church’s autocephaly from an academic 
journal published by a theological academy associated with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, in which he states that 
the 19th century brought “not only physical subjugation but spiritual enslavement” to the Georgian Orthodox 
Church (Kutateladze 2019, 149) 
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romantic and sublime imagining into a site of archaeological exploration (Manning 3-17, 2008). 
Although the tergdaleulebi were not seeking independence from the Russian Empire, the 
destruction of the material and ecclesiastical tradition of the Georgian Orthodox Church served 
as a symbol of the Russian colonial yoke in the Caucasus. Much like the liberal intelligentsia of 
other ethnicities in the Russian Empire, they pushed for political reform, the abolition of 
serfdom, greater respect for regional autonomy, and some early notions of human rights.  
In fin-de-siècle Georgia, although the autocephaly of the Church had been dissolved, 
seminaries and religious education were still incubators of diverse and radical thought. Following 
the Polish Uprising of 1863, Tsarist authorities, wary of nationalist movements, instituted harsh 
Russification policies. This was highly offensive to the overwhelmingly Georgian student body in 
seminary schools, and many of the most significant political leaders, nationalists, and socialist 
agitators of the era trace their roots back to the religious educational system.16 The Georgian 
clergy was regarded with distrust by their Russian leadership, and those suspected of supporting 
Georgian autocephaly were arrested. This issue came to a head in 1908, when Archbishop 
Nikon, the Russian Exarch of Georgia, was assassinated in his residence in Tbilisi, after which 
many Georgian priests were removed from their posts under suspicion of having collaborated 
with the murderers. Amid February Revolution in 1917, a group of Georgian clergymen declared 
the autocephaly of the GOC once more. From 1918 to 1921, Georgian social democrats 
embarked upon the first project of national self-determination in several centuries. They founded 
the Democratic Republic of Georgia, a paradigm shift that established independence as a 
normative idea for Georgians (Nodia 2018, 53). During this period, the Orthodox Church also 
reasserted its independence from its Russian counterpart. In 1921, however, the Red Army 
invaded, and Georgia was incorporated into the Soviet Union.  
 
4.1.C Soviet Georgia: The Failure of Forced Secularization 
The early Soviet period was marked by a forced secularization campaign and massive 
repressions of religion. The radical new government sponsored the physical destruction of places 
of worship, promoted atheism through the “Union of the Militant Godless,” and criminalized 
open involvement in religious communities, forcing religious practice underground and wiping 
out an entire generation of ecclesiastical authorities across the USSR (Dragadze 1993, 150). Early 
Soviet ideologues believed that all religious communities were socially regressive but that 
                                                          
16 These figures included Noe Zhordania, Ioseb Jughashvili (Joseph Stalin), and Silibistro Jibladze (Suny 2020, 42–
50).   
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ethnically-based religions promoted a particularism that contradicted the aims of their project, 
making them dually dangerous (S. F. Jones 1989). In his sociological analysis of the failure of the 
forced secularization project in the Soviet Union, Paul Froese argues that, as the State forged a 
socialist identity, authorities endeavored to drain the religious meaning from traditions and refill 
them with newly sacralized atheist civil content. The contents of this new Soviet civil religion 
were scientific atheism and Marxist-Leninist teachings. This included, most famously, 
secularizing religious holidays and designing new ones that reified Soviet power (rather than 
attending church on Easter, a good Soviet citizen would participate in May Day parades). 
Despite all of these efforts, however, there is ample evidence that, for many, religion was simply 
privatized and individualized (Dragadze 1993) in a form of passive resistance or “inner 
emigration” (Agadjanian 2001, 351).  
During World War II, the policy of official atheism was reversed, and religious 
organizations were formally permitted to return to the public sphere. On Stalin’s orders, the 
Russian Orthodox Church recognized the autocephaly of its Georgian counterpart in 1943 
(Corley 1996, 130; Suny 1994, 284). In the years that followed, religious groups remained under 
significant pressure and surveillance. State security services co-opted national churches and 
muftiates to maintain a lever of population control domestically and conduct espionage abroad. 
They used ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches to advocate for 
Soviet points of view on an international stage (Corley 1996, 291).17 Stoeckl argues that the 
experience of religious groups with socialist authorities, but the ROC, in particular, was marked 
by four primary forms of interaction that co-occurred: “repression, dissidence, collaboration, and 
emigration” (Stoeckl 2020).  
Despite this history of collaboration with the State, however, churches in many parts of 
Socialist Eastern Europe also amassed counter-culture credibility as some of the only 
organizations that were not, as far as the general public could tell, controlled by the State 
(Bociurkiw 1986; Johnston 1993). Religion and “secular dissidence” provided two potential 
alternative moral poles to the ideology and values promoted by the Soviet State (Wanner 2011, 
218–19). Since religious organizations suffered visible repression, to many, “the claim for 
religious freedom acted as a general claim for freedom of thought during and against the 
                                                          
17 Materials released as a part of a parliamentary commission conducted by the Russian State Duma in the 1990s 
largely confirmed suspicions of collaboration between the KGB and Armenian, Russian, and Georgian church 
authorities (“МАТЕРИАЛЫ КОМИССИИ ЯКУНИНА И ПОНОМАРЕВА 1990 ГОДА: Выписки Из 
Отчетов КГБ о Работе с Лидерами Московской Патриархии [Materials of the Yakunin and Ponomariyov 




Communist regime” (Barberini 2016, 151). This caused a convergence of views with nascent 
human rights and nationalist movements. In the 1960s and 70s, a young and anti-regime 
Georgian intelligentsia began turning to the Church as a demonstration of dissent against the 
government and an indication of nationalist sympathies (Zviadadze 2016, 233; Alekseeva 2012). 
Active young clergy members also filled the ranks in this era, following the mass purges of 
religious leaders in the decades prior.18 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union’s participation in the 
Helsinki Accords pushed Moscow to include a clause on religious freedom as a human right in 
the new Constitution adopted in 1977 (Boiter 1987, 116–17). While in the Soviet Union, these 
groups could consider themselves to be on the same side, the conflict between the visions of a 
good life and government espoused by religious and secular (often, but not always, pro-Western) 
actors animates Georgian political discourse to this day. 
As the National Liberation Movement headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Merab Kostava, 
and other dissidents, became increasingly popular in the perestroika era, Georgian Church 
officials “openly reclaim[ed] their role in the spiritual leadership of the nation” (S. F. Jones 1989, 
293; Janelidze 2014, 63). One of the most prominent examples of this took place on April 9th, 
1989, which directly precipitated Georgian calls for independence from the USSR. During large 
anti-government demonstrations in Tbilisi, Patriarch Ilia II joined protesters on the street and 
called for peace, requesting that the crowds enter the Kashveti Church of St. George to avoid 
conflict. They refused to leave, however, and the Soviet army violently dispersed the crowd, 
which resulted in 21 deaths. In the post-Soviet era, these events are memorialized annually on 
April 9th, the Day of National Unity in Georgia, and the victims have been presented as martyrs 
for independence (Abzianidze et al. 2016, 209). The Church also memorializes this event, 
portraying the Patriarch as a witness to and participant in the most tumultuous periods of recent 
Georgian history, including the independence movement.  
 
4.2. Post-Independence Church-State Relations 
 
4.2.A. The 1990s 
In contemporary Georgia, the Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status legally, 
politically, and culturally. After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the Republic of 
                                                          
18 Perhaps the first of this mold was Father Gabriel Urgebadze, who famously set fire to a poster of Lenin during 
the 1965 May Day parade in Tbilisi, accusing the crowd of idolatry (Oniani, n.d.). Father Gabriel was imprisoned in 
a psychiatric ward as punishment for this act. He lived until 1995 and was canonized in 2012 by the GOC. He was, 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, one of the most famous figures in the contemporary GOC, inspiring a wide array 
of popular religious practices and legends (Zviadadze 2016) 
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Georgia experienced a Civil War marked by armed conflict between warlords, a coup d’état, and 
the loss of two regions. In short, the 1990s was a period of acute political and economic crisis 
and near state failure. President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who began his career as a Soviet dissident, 
proclaimed a messianic ethnic Georgian nationalism and believed that Orthodoxy should be 
Georgia’s “state religion.” He also accused the “red clergy” of collaborating with the Soviet 
government against the people’s interests (Chitanava 2015). Despite the relative prosperity of the 
Georgian SSR in the Soviet Union, by the mid-90s, the country was in ruins. In this context of 
complete institutional collapse, the GOC was one of the only poles of moral authority and 
guidance for a beleaguered population. 
Eduard Shevardnadze recognized this and established a norm of the government relying 
on the Church for political legitimization. He was baptized by Patriarch Ilia II personally in 1992. 
Then, during a moment of political crisis, when Shevardnadze was the Chairman of the 
Parliament in 1993, the Patriarch expressed support for him. He stated, “‘The whole of Georgia 
is nervous. As the spiritual father of Georgia and personally your spiritual father, I have the right 
to give benediction to you to announce that you are the head of Georgia’” (Chitanava 2015, 42). 
This partnership with the Church is usually attributed to the politician’s sense of pragmatism 
rather than out of a strong sense of personal faith (Darchiashvili 2005, 173–74). Shevardnadze 
was officially elected to the Presidency in 1995 and was instrumental in creating the two most 
important documents that regulate the Church-State relationship in Georgia to this day: the 1995 
Constitution and the 2002 Concordat, discussed in the following section in order of their legal 
precedence.  
 
4.2.B. The Legal Basis of the Church-State Relationship in Georgia 
The Constitution of the Republic of Georgia guarantees the right to equality and 
freedom from discrimination on the grounds of religion (Article 11) and to freedom of belief 
(Article 16). The document claims to reflect the principles established in the 1921 Constitution 
of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. This earlier Constitution established the separation of 
Church and State and prohibited discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities (Gunn 
and Nygaard 2015, 28–29). The 1995 Constitution includes Article 9, which notes the 
“outstanding role of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the history of Georgia, 
and its independence from the state.” This article represented a compromise between more 
liberal forces, who preferred an entirely secular approach in the Constitution, and parts of the 
Georgian public who wanted tangible legal recognition of the Church’s importance to the 
country (Nodia and Scholtbach 2006, 70–71). Constitutional recognition, which entails the 
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symbolic privileging of one community over others, is observed in Europe, the Orthodox world, 
and the former Soviet region.19  
The second foundational document is the Constitutional Agreement, or Concordat, 
between the Republic of Georgia and the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Signed into power 
by Shevardnadze and Patriarch Ilia II in 2002, this document outlines in more concrete terms the 
nature of the relationship between the two institutions. It establishes a norm that the State and 
the Church should “collaborate to ensure the welfare of the population maintaining the principle 
of mutual interdependence” (Article 1), as well as a series of practical agreements on the 
recognition of religious marriages and educational degrees, an exemption for clergy from military 
service, and religious education in schools. The Patriarch is granted legal immunity according to 
the Concordat. It also outlines that the Church’s tax-exempt status, that the State will provide 
monetary assistance to the Church as restitution for damages incurred during the Russian 
Imperial and Soviet eras, and the State’s responsibility for the care and management of Church 
properties, lands, and treasures. In terms of legal precedence, the Concordat is second only to 
the Constitution and the body of Constitutional law. This means that it takes priority over all 
international treaties and other national laws (Tsintsadze 2007, 751).  
Various criticisms have been leveled against the Concordat since it was signed. Firstly, 
the imbalanced nature of the agreement and privileged status that it affords to the Georgian 
Orthodox Church has caused significant issues in the area of minority rights. The Concordat also 
represented a compromise – it was advocated for by liberal politicians who believed that it would 
be a way to avoid more restrictive laws on religion. In practice, however, international 
organizations, civil society watchdogs, lawyers, and representatives of religious minority 
communities argue that the contents of the Concordat are discriminatory because they legally 
privilege the Church above the rest of the population (Gunn and Nygaard 2015; Begadze 2017; 
Tsintsadze 2007). Despite Georgia’s robust and enthusiastic participation in the international 
promotion of human rights,20 a document which, in essence, legalizes a discriminatory status 
quo remains in force domestically. Secondly, the financial dimensions of the Concordat have 
come under particular scrutiny in the past several years. This data was revealed to a broader 
                                                          
19 United Kingdom, Denmark, and Finland are included in the first category. The second group of Orthodox 
countries includes, for example, Greece and Bulgaria. Many post-Soviet states have constitutional recognition of a 
specific religious community and an official list of religious groups that are legally deemed “traditional” to the 
territory. This designation was designed to block foreign proselytism. Georgia does not have a special law on 
religions that establishes traditional faiths.  
20 For a complete list of all international treaties and agreements on human rights and non-discrimination that 
Georgia is a party or signatory to, consult Gunn and Nygaard (Gunn and Nygaard 2015, 31–39).  
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audience with the publication of a project called the “Patriarchate’s Capital,” which provided 
evidence of high levels of personal wealth among a number of Church hierarchs (Japiashvili, 
Lomadze, and Bakradze 2017). Critics argue that the wording of the Concordat enables a system 
ripe for abuse by political elites. Political leaders are frequently accused of engaging in a kind of 
quid-pro-quo agreement with the Church, providing funding to the Patriarchate and hierarchs 
through various means in exchange for their political support during election seasons. This status 
quo led Karlo Godoladze to argue in 2015 that Georgia could be best described as a 
“constitutional theocracy,” in which the policy of state secularism in the Constitution is 
consistently undermined by “orthodox theocratic narratives” seen in practice (Godoladze 2015, 
195). Thus, the Concordat is the framework upon which various levels of entanglement between 
the State and Church are fleshed out and enacted.  
 
4.2.C Post-Rose Revolution Church-State Relations (2004-2012) 
Following the 2003 Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected as the President of 
Georgia, and the United National Movement, the political party he founded in 2001, won a 
majority of the seats in the Parliament. UNM had a reformist agenda composed of policies 
designed to reduce corruption and strengthen the state. Part of the purpose of this was to 
facilitate Georgia’s geopolitical reorientation towards the EU and NATO. The Patriarch, notably, 
officially supported this westward shift. However, analysts generally agree that Church-State 
relations under the UNM government were characterized by conflicts that grew progressively 
more visible in Saakashvili’s second term, although the exact nature and reasons for this 
antagonism are a matter of some debate.  
Literature on Church-State relations during the Saakashvili era generally holds that two 
national identity projects were developing simultaneously – one espoused by the Church and 
another by the State, and that much of the tension was due to incongruences between these 
visions of Georgia. Beginning in Shevardnadze’s era, the Church was engaged in a kind of re-
expansion of religion into areas that had been forcibly secularized in the Soviet era – such as 
schools (Gurchiani 2017a). This period also saw an extensive campaign to construct new 
churches around the country (Manning 2008, 17). Serrano argued that the GOC was engaging in 
a literal and symbolic “desecularization” of the country through reclamation of the physical 
landscape and national heritage (Serrano 2010). In philosopher Giga Zedania’s view, the GOC 
began to articulate a kind of “religious nationalism,” according to which Orthodoxy is the 
primary constitutive attribute of Georgianness. Zedania further claimed that this was a form of 
backlash against what he characterized as a revolutionary civic nationalism espoused by UNM 
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(Zedania 2011, 124–25). Andronikashvili and Maisuradze also argued in 2010 that the GOC’s 
nationalism, which both Shevardnadze and Saakashvili drew upon for legitimacy, was expansive, 
even absorbing and sacralizing secular figures in Georgian history like Ilia Chavchavadze, and 
fundamentally oriented towards the pre-modern past (Maisuradze and Andronikashvili 2010). 
Questions of how the State engaged with these narratives from the Church and what 
type of nationalism typified each actor dominated scholarly debates of this era. Saakashvili 
endeavored to rebrand Georgia and introduced Christian imagery into the national repertoire of 
symbols.21 This prompted some, such as Tornike Metreveli, to argue that it would be more 
appropriate to characterize UNM’s nationalism as hybrid in nature, as the conflation of 
Orthodox Christianity and Georgianness was not inclusive to the non-Orthodox part of the 
country (Metreveli 2016). Janelidze characterized the relationship as conflict-ridden, observing 
the interplay between top-down efforts at secularization and GOC-led pushes to desecularize 
(Janelidze 2014). This dynamic also changed over time due to external conditions. In his analysis 
of the reconstruction of the 11th century Bagrati Cathedral in Kutaisi, Long found that 
Saakashvili and the GOC were willing to sacrifice architectural fidelity and a spot on the 
UNESCO World Heritage List to create a symbol of national unity and rebirth out of the site 
following the 2008 war (Long 2017).  
One scholar whose work has helped to bridge the gulf between these various views is 
Tamar Gamkrelidze. She argues that an agonistic dynamic, or productive conflict, marked the 
relationship between UNM and the GOC. In her view, President Saakashvili utilized a 
combination of “cooperation, persuasion, appeasement, and marginalization” to keep the 
Patriarchate and Church engaged in the State’s “European project,” or goal of Euro-Atlantic 
integration (Gamkrelidze 2018, 272–73), which is now a dominant goal in Georgian political 
discourse (Kakachia, Lebanidze, and Dubovyk 2019). This, Gamkrelidze argues, allowed the 
State to limit the Church’s role in the “cognitive structures” of the country while still gaining its 
support for an ambitious geopolitical reorientation. However, the Patriarch’s acceptance of the 
European project has always been conditional, as he believes that the country should never have 
to compromise its traditional values or the “treasures” of Georgian culture to integrate into 
Europe (Batiashvili 2018, 16–18).  
The GOC was also undergoing a dramatic shift internally during this period. A sense of 
insecurity in the newly-opened spiritual “marketplace” caused post-Soviet religious communities 
                                                          
21 For example, St. George is now on the presidential crest, and the five-cross flag was adopted soon after 
Saakashvili came to power. 
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to embark on aggressive “anti-cult” campaigns throughout the 90s and early 2000s. Many priests 
in the Russian Orthodox Church, for example, argued that foreign religious missionaries were 
“’spiritual colonizers’” (Baran 2006, 642–44). This tendency was also visible in the GOC in the 
late 1990s, when a radical wing rose to prominence. One of the first significant actions 
undertaken in Church-State relations after the Rose Revolution was the arrest of Basil 
Mkalasvishvili and several followers of his22 in connection with a series of mob attacks that they 
carried out against religious minorities from 1999-2003 (Human Rights Watch 2005). Although the 
GOC publicly distanced themselves from these individuals, the Patriarch also labeled those who 
spread “’sectarian doctrines” as “enemies of the nation’” (Chitanava 2015, 43). Many clergy 
members, as well as much of the general public, were sympathetic to the offenders (Nodia and 
Scholtbach 2006, 71).  
 
4.2.D Church-State Relations Under Georgian Dream (2012-2020) 
Several significant changes have occurred in recent years in Religion-State relations that 
are worth noting, although the general paradigm of the ruling party relying on the Church for 
legitimacy has remained in place. In 2012, the Georgian Dream coalition, founded by 
businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, came to power via parliamentary elections. Georgian Dream 
accepted the paradigm established by Shevardnadze and UNM of pursuing integration in both 
the EU and NATO. In 2014, the government established the State Agency for Religious Issues 
under the purview of the Prime Minister. The primary goal of this agency is to manage the 
relationships between religious communities and their interactions with the State. However, it 
has been criticized as ineffective, particularly by members of the Muslim community in Georgia 
(Aydingün, Köksal, and Kahraman 2019, 297–99). The GOC has also moved forward and signed 
memoranda of agreement with the Ministries of Justice and Education, which establish more 
concretely how the terms of the Concordat should be enacted (Jgharkava 2017, 7).  
The question of the social responsibilities and duties of Church officials has come under 
scrutiny due to a number of scandals in recent years. Many priests publicly attended rallies 
supporting GD during the 2012 elections despite the Patriarchate’s official position of political 
neutrality (Chitanava 2015, 49). Similarly, on May 17th, 2013, a large number of 
                                                          
22 Mkalavishvili was defrocked by the GOC in 1995 and established an independent church in the Gldani suburb of 
Tbilisi. This Church is affiliated with the Church of the Genuine Orthodox Christians of Greece, a group that broke 
off from the Orthodox Church of Greece over the latter’s involvement in the ecumenical movement. After his 2004 
arrest, Mkalavishvili was sentenced to six years in prison but was released in 2008 (Blagovest Info 2008). Since then, he 
has been preaching at the Gldani Diocese (“Diocese of Gldani Tbilisi (Georgia)” n.d.). The GOC considers this 
church to be schismatic.  
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counterdemonstrators, including priests, attacked a peaceful demonstration planned on the 
International Day against Homophobia. The Patriarchate condemned the attacks, and the 
Parliament was reluctant to investigate the violence (Crego 2014, 145).23  In 2014, the Parliament 
adopted the Law on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination, which included a clause 
protecting gender equality and the rights of LGBT+ individuals. As the law was necessary to 
establish a visa-free regime with the EU, it was a high priority. The Church protested against the 
law’s adoption, eventually receiving a small concession in the text that the Concordat could not 
be contradicted by the exercise of this law (Chitanava 2015, 50).  
 Although these cases are very different at face value, they both represent frontiers of 
secularization and counter-secularization in contemporary Georgian society. Should the clergy be 
considered private citizens or representatives of the Church when they attend political rallies? To 
what extent should Church officials engage in electoral politics? To what extent can groups of 
devout believers shape laws that impact the entire country? Should the Church be permitted to 
handle cases of criminal activity committed by clergy members internally, or should the State 
intervene? These are all questions currently being debated in Georgian society. 
In a blog post about the present case, philosopher Zaal Andronikashvili, using a 
Schmittian definition of the state of emergency, argued that the Church was essentially anointing 
itself the sovereign through its decision to defy emergency regulations. (Andronikashvili 2020a). 
This argument is part of a broader narrative that he has developed in his work that the Church’s 
primary goal in political engagement is to develop sovereignty or immunity within the State, to 
undermine its democratic order from within, and to establish a constitutional monarchy with the 
GOC as the state religion. He has recently completed a book about the institutional restructuring 
of the Church, which occurred during the Stalinist era, in which the more democratic Church 
Assembly was replaced with the institution of the Patriarchate. He argues that the current 
political project of the Patriarchate can be attributed to the institution’s authoritarian past 
(Andronikashvili 2020b). 
 
4.3. The Novel Coronavirus 
4.3.A. COVID-19 in Early 2020 
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is an infectious disease first recognized in December 
2019 in the Hubei province of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese government 
                                                          
23 Five clergy members were arrested, but the charges against them were eventually dropped in 2015 after a 
protracted trial in the Tbilisi City Court (Civil GE 2015). 
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established strict lockdown measures relatively early on. The virus, however, began to spread 
rapidly across Asia and the rest of the world in early 2020. By March 11th, the World Health 
Organization officially declared that COVID-19 was a global pandemic (Adhanom 2020), and 
Italy and Iran were in the midst of deadly first waves. As the virus is being actively studied at the 
time of writing and knowledge continues to develop, this section provides a brief snapshot of 
what was widely known about this illness in early 2020. 
Certain features of the COVID-19 were confirmed early on. When symptomatic, it 
typically presents like the flu, with respiratory issues, fever, sore throat, and loss of taste or smell. 
Because the illness targets the upper respiratory tract, it is transmitted primarily, although not 
exclusively, through droplets or vaporized virions coming into contact with and populating the 
mucous membranes of the face. Therefore, the WHO recommended donning face masks and 
maintaining a distance of two meters between individuals in public. The question of whether 
surface contact could cause transmission was unresolved at this point. The elderly and 
immunocompromised were considered the highest-risk populations. 
COVID-19 was particularly challenging for public health authorities to address with 
traditional contact tracing methods. The original novel coronavirus has an exceptionally long 
incubation period of up to 14 days. Moreover, by late April 2020, it was already discussed in 
medical journals that asymptomatic transmission was possible, meaning that simply isolating 
individuals after symptoms appear is a useful but imperfect strategy (Gandhi, Yokoe, and Havlir 
2020). Finally, basic data about viral behavior and mortality rates were lacking, which 
complicated policy decisions. 
 
4.3.B. The Governmental Response to COVID-19 in Georgia 
The General Director of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom, stated that countries must “strike 
a fine balance between protecting health, minimizing economic and social disruption, and 
respecting human rights” (Adhanom 2020). The Georgian response to COVID-19 was swift 
and, in keeping with European countries, marked by restrictions on movement and gathering. 
Central to their messaging was the expertise of several prominent medical professionals from the 
Centre for Disease Control and Prevention and the Ministry of Health. Officials like Amiran 
Gamkrelidze, Tengiz Tsertsvadze, Paata Imnadze, and Ekaterine Tikaradze became household 
names. Doctors shared daily updates on the status of individual patients to the press, 
underscoring that the Georgian Dream government’s policy was to defer to medical 
professionals. In a note that is particularly relevant to the topic of this study, both public health 
and government officials tried to negotiate directly with the Church. The early results of the 
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Georgian approach were assessed positively both domestically and internationally (JAM News 
2020; Lomsadze 2020; Foreign Policy 2020; “EU Ambassador on Covid-19 in Georgia” 2020). By 
the end of May 2020, there had been approximately 4700 cases and 27 deaths in the country in 
total, significantly less than all neighboring territories (OC Media 2020b). This strict approach 
caused significant economic contraction but allowed Georgia to stave off the true first wave of 
the virus until Fall 2020 (OC Media 2020c).  
 
4.4. Eastern Orthodoxy, Easter Traditions, and Physical Worship 
 The Eastern Orthodox Church, of which the Georgian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church is one member, is comprised of a group of Churches that share their foundational beliefs 
but operate independently of one another. Each constituent church has its own Catholicos-
Patriarch or Primate (leader) and its own Holy Synod (executive decision-making body). 
Although the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople is recognized as the primus inter pares, or 
“first among equals,” this authority is symbolic, and the Ecumenical Patriarch cannot exercise 
control over the internal affairs of other Orthodox Churches. Despite operating independently, 
however, Orthodox Churches consider themselves part of a broader community and share many 
worship practices and interpretive traditions. As COVID loomed, Orthodox Churches 
worldwide dealt with an almost identical set of problems – reconciling a deeply embodied and 
communally-oriented worship tradition with new social distancing mandates. 
 
4.4.A. Easter in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition 
 Easter and the Holy Week preceding it are the most important collective celebrations of 
the entire year. These festivities in the Orthodox tradition take place in two main settings: the 
Church and the graveyard. Traditions involve gathering in the Church for Palm Sunday and 
performing a “liturgical passion play” over the Holy Week, “reenacting the final events in the life 
of Christ on Earth” (Harakas 2002, 15–21). The holiday culminates in an overnight vigil in the 
church on Saturday evening in anticipation of Easter Sunday, which celebrates the resurrection 
of Jesus. During this time, Orthodox tradition also holds that flames miraculously appear in 
Christ’s tomb in Jerusalem before Easter. This flame is spread across the city from candle to 
candle and is physically carried back home to Orthodox countries, where the fire is distributed 
among the population (Romey 2020). 
It is also common for families to visit cemeteries to honor their deceased family 
members on or around Easter Sunday. There is significant regional variation in folk practices, 
but standard features involve cleaning gravestones, holding a celebratory meal outdoors, or 
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bringing offerings like candles, flowers, candy, or alcohol to graveyards (Shalvashvili 2018, 23; 
Otarashvili 2013). Across the Orthodox world, these festivities serve as a reason to travel to see 
one’s family. 
 
4.4.B The Physicality of Orthodox Worship 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity is, generally speaking, highly “embodied” in its practices 
(Riccardi and Sokoll 2014), placing great emphasis on materiality, communal gathering, contact 
with ritually pure or holy objects, and physical conditioning through fasting and extended 
periods of performed prayer. For believers, all of these elements combine to create a 
transformative spiritual experience and are considered necessary to reap the full benefits of 
worship. Practices that directly conflicted with the new social distancing mandates across 
Orthodox communities included but were not limited to: 
a. Communal prayer: The importance of gathering for the liturgy cannot be understated in 
Eastern Orthodoxy. A priest traditionally sings the liturgy in its entirety, with the 
congregation joining in at various points. 
b. The use of shared communion spoons and chalices: Orthodox believe that sacramental wine 
and bread literally transform into the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Due to their holy 
and mysterious nature, sacramental offerings must be handled in specific ways which 
differ based on the community. In many Eastern Orthodox Churches, this usually means 
a serving spoon and chalice made of some form of precious metal, a practice that is 
presumed to date back at least a millennium based on archaeological excavations of 
Byzantine churches (Taft 1996). 
c. Kissing icons and other religious items: Orthodox Christians often attribute miraculous 
powers to icons. Kissing an icon or touching a relic is a means of accessing the divine or 
communing with God through a holy object. Viewing a reproduction or representation 
of an icon on a screen cannot and does not, in this tradition, carry the same spiritual 
benefit (Ponomariov 2016). The importance of physical proximity to icons and their 
capacity for spiritual protection is apparent in the common practice of icon marches, in 
which priests remove the icon or relic from its home in a church or reliquary to 
circumambulate areas in need of protection.  
The emphasis on material objects mediating the human-divine experience extends to the 
buildings of Eastern Orthodox Churches, which are consecrated using physical relics from saints. 
In some strains of Georgian folk Christianity, the very stones and earth from the grounds of 
Churches are believed to be imbued with the power of holy patronage (Dragadze 1993, 149). 
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Due to this emphasis on material mediation in the Orthodox tradition, many priests and faithful 
alike believe that it is impossible to fall ill while standing in churches or that communion spoons 
and chalices cannot be sources of viral infection due to the holy nature of their contents 
(Anyfantakis 2020). In the past year, this physicality has been the subject of much debate in 
religious and secular communities in the Orthodox world. 
 
4.4.C Online Services  
The obvious response to mandated social distancing is broadcasting remote services via 
the internet, television, radio, or other media. However, a combination of theological specificities 
in Orthodox doctrine and cultural norms contributed to the reluctance of many hierarchs to 
transition to mediated forms of worship. The leadership of some Orthodox churches regards the 
internet as a ritually impure space (Suslov 2016), a stance which made them reluctant to practice 
online religion even as internet access and use spread among worshippers.24 As Zviadadze notes, 
however, the past decade has seen a shift towards online religiosity among Georgian youth, who 
are less likely to engage in religious communities traditionally, but often incorporate religious 
imagery into self-identification on social media platforms (Zviadadze 2014). The GOC and many 
of its clergy maintain a robust presence in the media. Priests and monks regularly post their 
opinions and sermons on Facebook, make appearances on traditional television channels and 
online shows, and, in some cases, run their own YouTube channels. Archpriest Teodore 
Gignadze, for example, had over 230,000 followers in 202025 on Facebook and has been 
regularly streaming sermons and speeches to his followers for years (“მამა თეოდორე 
გიგნაძის ქადაგებები (Father Theodore Gignadze’s Sermons)” 2012). Priest-influencers help 
to “reinforce loyalty, knowledge, and ownership among believers” (Zviadadze 2014, 186) but 
also run the risk of contradicting the Patriarchate with their platforms. So, while specific 
theological and cultural barriers to using mediated forms of worship exist in Orthodoxy, it would 
                                                          
24 In an early work focusing on religion on the internet, Helland distinguished between “online religion” and 
“religion online.” The former is the actual practice of spiritual activities in digital space (for example, streaming 
sermons or holding blessings online), as opposed to “religion online,” which entails information-giving and the 
facilitation of offline religious practices (Helland 2005). This distinction is helpful to keep in mind when discussing 
Orthodox Churches. Many are willing to share calendars and create Patriarchate websites but resisted, for example, 
posting videos of sermons online until relatively recently.  




be erroneous to assert that the Church was incapable of making this transition. This is in sharp 
























                                                          
26 Members of the Haredi (or “Ultra-Orthodox”) Jewish community in Israel continued to gather into April 2020 
despite nationwide restrictions, causing some of the earliest clusters in the country. This happened, in part, because 
the belief system of this insular community forbids them from using the internet and accessing secular media. To 
address this gap, the Israeli government produced a targeted information campaign and deployed several military 
units to specifically enforce restrictions in majority Haredi neighborhoods (Harman, Maital, and Roeder, n.d.).  
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Chapter 5. Church Narratives 
In this chapter, I first present a selection of representative statements from Church 
officials on issues pertaining to the coronavirus throughout the state of emergency and then 
discuss the implications of these positions. This chapter proposes that the GOC engages in 
political claim-making in a manner typical of traditionalists. They argue for a position that 
privileges Orthodoxy, challenges scientific knowledge, and articulates the right to gatherings and 
communion in terms of religious liberties or the rights of the individual believer. That all of these 
claims were accommodated by the government makes this case a significant recent example of 
formal desecularization. This chapter also explores the underlying ideological currents in the 
Church and posits that a compromise between traditionalists and fundamentalists led to the 
outcome in this case. 
 
5.1 The Response of the Church 
While one often sees statements such as “according to the Church …” in the foreign and 
Georgian press, this synecdoche is not as simple as it might appear. Eastern Orthodox Churches 
feature a unique hierarchical structure that is internally regarded as an earthly reflection of the 
divine order in heaven. The foundational decision-making unit is the Holy Synod, a group of 
high-ranking clergy members who gather on a regular basis. The Holy Synod of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church comprises 47 members, most of whom are responsible for the pastoral 
ministry of a specific geographical area, called an eparchy. The Catholicos-Patriarch is the 
chairperson of the Synod and leader, but the collective determines the official positions of the 
Church.27  
Like any institution made up of individuals, the personal views of the Patriarch and 
clergy members may differ from the official positions of the Church as determined by the 
Synod.28 Church matters and decisions often carry implications for the entire populace. As 
                                                          
27 Although the Patriarch is often described as an Eastern Orthodox analog to the Roman Catholic Pope, this is an 
oversimplification that obscures significant theological and practical differences between the two groups of 
Christians. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, which has a single Pope who is believed to be infallible on matters 
of doctrine, Eastern Orthodox Churches hold that their Patriarchs are human and therefore subject to error (T. 
Jones and Walker 2018). The powers of the Patriarch (and the Patriarchate as an institution) are dynamic: they vary 
between Orthodox Churches and, within the same Church, in different historical periods.  
28 In some cases, this type of disagreement occurs under the threat of schism. Perhaps the most prominent example 
of this was the 1997 withdrawal of the GOC from ecumenical movements, including the World Council of 
Churches and Council of European Churches. Prior to that, Patriarch Ilia II was personally deeply involved in the 
ecumenical movement and served as the co-president of the WCC from 1983-1991 (Tinikashvili 2019, 133–37). 
However, several bishops who shared anti-ecumenical beliefs drafted an open letter to the Patriarch, arguing that 
interconfessional dialogue is a form of heresy (“An Open Letter to Patriarch Ilia II of Georgia from the 
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discussed in Chapter 4, the Orthodox Church also receives funding directly from the State’s 
budget. Thus, Synod decisions are followed closely in the Georgian media, and representatives of 
the Church regularly express their personal opinions to the press. This situation can lead to some 
confusion: if a priest makes a statement that contradicts the official position of the Church, and 
the Patriarchate or the Synod does not publicly rebuke or correct the individual in question, the 
general public sometimes interprets this as a kind of tacit institutional approval. As the pace of 
media coverage quickens, the question of who actually speaks on behalf of the Church has 
become more convoluted. This loose media policy causes significant discord amongst clergy 
members, including in this case (On.Ge News 2020b; Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church 2020b). In an effort to avoid the conflation of the positions of different categories of the 
hierarchy, the claims presented by the GOC and its various representatives are subdivided here 
into announcements of the Holy Synod, statements and sermons from the Patriarch or his 
office’s press corps, and, finally, comments made by individual members of the clergy that were 
reported in the Georgian press. The latter draws on a set of about 210 quotes from members of 
the clergy made during this period. 
 
5.1.A From the Holy Synod 
 At the end of an emergency meeting on March 20th, the Holy Synod released a statement 
sharing the Church’s official positions relating to the coronavirus and the new emergency 
restrictions imposed by the government. They held that the “spiritual cause” of the illness is 
“man’s distance from God” and framed the pandemic as a trial through which believers may 
learn about themselves and express their faith (Holy Synod of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
2020). They accepted that the virus is a genuine threat to the security of the nation and asked 
that the population follow the advice of medical authorities. In addition, they recommended that 
believers keep holy water at home, read the Gospels, and recite specific sets of prayers 
individually as additional spiritual reinforcement. 
The two most controversial aspects of this communique pertained to the red lines that 
the Church established: restrictions on mass gatherings and the use of shared spoons and 
chalices to serve sacramental bread and wine to parishioners. On the former point, the Synod 
never publicly entertained the option of stopping services but chose instead to recommend 
accommodations designed to reduce the risks associated with gathering. They gave approval for 
                                                          
Brotherhood of the Monastery of Saint Shio of Mghvime” 1997). As a result, and under threat of schism, the 
Church has since avoided participation in any ecumenical organizations aside from the Interreligious Council of the 
CIS (Tinikashvili 2019, 157) and interfaith dialogues organized by the State Agency for Religious Issues.  
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priests to conduct the liturgy outdoors on makeshift altars in Church courtyards, installed sound 
systems, and promoted social distancing among parishioners. They asked the ill, 
immunocompromised, and elderly to stay at home and follow along with services simultaneously 
and also established protocols for priests to provide individual assistance to parishioners, 
including home visits in extraordinary cases. The Synod weighed in on the importance of the 
eucharist and its centrality to the faith. They stated that it is “unacceptable for Church members 
to doubt the essence of the sacrament of communion and to express it in action – for example, 
to refuse to share a common spoon [out of belief that it is] a source of disease transmission” 
(Holy Synod of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020). They did, however, allow believers to 
consume wine with single-use or personal glasses immediately following the communion bread, 
which was still served using a single metal spoon (Apriamashvili 2020).  
In this same document, the Synod expressed its support of the government’s policies and 
the efforts of healthcare workers. They committed to providing “spiritual nourishment” to 
Georgians abroad and those living in the contested territories. Finally, the Synod underscored 
that any medical facilities owned by the Patriarchate would be made available to bolster the 
government’s efforts against the pandemic.29  
 
5.1.B From the Patriarchate 
The views presented in this section come from a variety of sources: weekly sermons 
delivered by Patriarch Ilia II himself, published statements and comments from the institution’s 
website, and interviews with Archbishop Andria Jaghmaidze, the head of the Patriarchate’s 
public relations department. In keeping with the views later expressed in the March 20th decision 
of the Holy Synod, the Patriarchate consistently maintained that faith was necessary to combat 
the virus. In his March 1st sermon, Patriarch Ilia II shared a mystical vision that he had 
experienced and interpreted its meaning as a sign that humankind would overcome the virus 
with the assistance of God (Tabula 2020b). Throughout this period, he reaffirmed the Synod’s 
framing of the virus as a trial for believers which could not be beaten successfully without the 
                                                          
29 It should be noted that the GOC independently operates a number of educational and medical facilities, 
including hospitals, orphanages, and schools, and receives both tax benefits and direct funding from the government 
to assist them in their mission (Japiashvili, Lomadze, and Bakradze 2017). Medical centers owned by the Patriarchate 
were, indeed, enlisted in the government’s response to the virus (Sapatriarkos Televizija “Ertsulovneba” 2020). One 
aspect of the Church’s activity that could be a fruitful subject for further research is how and whether the norms of 
the State of Emergency were implemented in these institutions owned by the Church, as some have been criticized 
in the past for failing to allow external oversight.  
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Church. He identified the estrangement of humans from the divine as a significant issue and 
asked the nation to unify around the Church both figuratively and literally: 
“We must do all that we can to make our way to the Kingdom. We are told to stand at a 
distance. This is the means… the small means that the Lord has given us. […] Whatever 
happens, stand at a distance, but stand around the Church. It’s all for you. All of this is 
easy to do. The main point is that we don’t separate from the Lord, that we are still with 
the Lord.” (Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020c) 
In this statement and others like it, the Patriarch emphasizes that believers should comply with 
those aspects of state public health directives that the Church determined necessary (mainly, 
maintaining physical distance during services and avoiding public worship activities if one was ill 
or elderly). He repeatedly thanked the government, healthcare workers, and the general 
population for their high level of social responsibility and efforts to keep the virus at bay. The 
Patriarchate also organized various tours of icons around the country and sprayed the streets of 
Tbilisi with holy water.30 
Patriarch Ilia’s most explicit statements on the matter are found in the Easter Epistle 
itself. In this sermon, he praised the development of local agriculture that occurred as a result of 
economic isolation and thanked God that religious services in Georgia, unlike in most other 
countries, were not disturbed: 
“Thank God that the liturgy in churches in Georgia was not stopped, not even on Easter 
night. With the help of God, the help of doctors, the actions of the government, and the 
responsibility of the population, the pandemic did not cause us big problems. God 
willing, difficulties will not be created and in the future, [and] Georgia and the world will 
be saved from this ordeal. I cannot thank our parishioners, who, with their outstanding 
observance of order and recommended norms, did not shy away from standing in the 
open air for hours in the cold, wind, and rain […] I would also like to bless those 
believers, the elderly and infirm, who have prayed and continue to pray with us from 
home” (Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020g) 
In this speech, the Patriarch demonstrates that the ability to continue services uninterrupted was 
the main priority of the Church.31 In the same sermon, he also discussed at length the 
                                                          
30 The first of these tours occurred on March 17th, when Priests ritually purified the streets of Tbilisi with holy 
water to ward off the virus (Georgian Orthodox Church Blesses Tbilisi Streets against Coronavirus 2020). On March 26th, 
Archbishop Iakob of Bodbe took an icon of the Virgin Mary on a helicopter tour around Tbilisi (Patriarchate of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church 2020e). The Patriarchate also blessed the streets as a part of an annual tradition marking 
the Day of Family Purity on May 17th. This date is also, notably, the International Day Against Homophobia, 
Biphobia, and Transphobia. In 2013, an anti-homophobia rally held in Tbilisi was attacked by a group of protesters 
and radical clergy members, prompting the Patriarch to establish the May 17th as an official Church holiday 
honoring traditional families in the following year (JAMNews Tbilisi 2018). 
31 The Patriarch repeated very similar statements in his April 26th and May 6th sermons, thanking the government 
and comparing the ability to worship freely in Georgia favorably to the more extensive lockdowns in other countries 
(Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020i; 2020h). 
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importance of confession and communion, the focal point of external and internal critiques of 
the GOC at the time. He compares communion to manna from heaven, a miraculous food from 
the Book of Exodus which is believed to have sustained the Israelites during their 40 years of 
wandering in the desert,32 in a rhetorical extension of the argument made throughout this period 
that communion is, for believers, life-sustaining and necessary (Interpress News Georgia 2020a). 
Although the Patriarch continued to give sermons, much of the task of communicating 
the specific positions of the office towards limitations on gathering and sanitary standards fell to 
Archbishop Andria and the press team. On February 28th, the Patriarchate published a written 
statement on their website in response to claims that the Romanian Orthodox Church was 
modifying the ritual of communion. In this document, they outlined the “millennial history” of 
the practice of using a shared spoon and claimed that, in the past, believers did not abstain from 
communion during periods of epidemic illness (Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
2020a). Archbishop Andria reaffirmed this position in other interviews, consistently holding that 
there was no danger associated with the use of shared spoons for communion because of the 
ritual purity of the eucharist (On.Ge News 2020a).  
In a somewhat sharp tonal contrast to the gratitude expressed by the Patriarch in 
sermons, the office of the Patriarchate aired its frustration with both the attention they were 
receiving and how their messages were covered in the media on several occasions. On March 
19th, the Patriarchate’s press service released a statement requesting that members of the media 
and clergy refrain from sharing their personal opinions on issues related to the coronavirus until 
the cessation of the March 20th meeting of the Holy Synod (Patriarchate of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church 2020b). By March 28th, after the announcement of the decisions of the Holy 
Synod, the Patriarchate released another statement criticizing media coverage of the Church, 
presumably in response to an open letter from various NGOs which requested that the Church 
consider its social responsibility:  
“Some media outlets portray the situation in a way that creates a feeling that they are 
artificially preparing the public to blame the Church for possible problems in the future, despite 
the fact that the Church is trying to protect the State, including the [implementation of] 
safety measures established by the National Center for Disease Control” (Patriarchate of 
the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020d) (emphasis mine) 
                                                          
32 Manna has not been mentioned in any of the other Easter Epistles of the past decade but is nonetheless an 
understandable inclusion. It is common for Christians to interpret the story of Exodus as a kind of Old Testament 
reflection of Jesus’ life, and explicit comparisons between the resurrection, which is celebrated at Easter, and the 
salvation of the Israelites are found throughout the New Testament. John 6:30-36, in which Jesus discusses this 
comparison between the manna and himself, is a clear example of this tendency.  
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In this same statement, they write that some in both the clergy and the general public were 
hindered in their faith by “propaganda going on in the world today and in our country,” and stated 
that “forbidding [the public] from attending Church services is unjust and a crime against God” 
(Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020d). In interviews in the following days, 
Jaghmaidze tied this treatment to what he understands as a broader pattern of behavior from 
parts of Georgian society and the media who, in his view, oppose the Church whenever possible: 
“Our people can clearly see that, for several years, any available means have been used 
against the Church. Be it cyanide,33 be it the virus, or something else. We are accustomed 
to attempts to use everything to discredit the Church” (On.Ge News 2020c) 
Jaghmaidze also referenced a kind of “spiritual virus” or “spiritual corona” infecting the public, 
in particular when referring to the tendency to rebuke or criticize others (Tabula 2020d). These 
statements combined reveal that the highest echelons of the Church felt that they were the target 
of a campaign of persecution during this period, which, in their view, was even finding 
supporters within their own ranks.  
 
5.1.C From the Clergy: 
 The opinions of the clergy varied greatly but can be roughly categorized into three main 
groups: those who generally supported the Synod’s decisions and deferred to the announcements 
of the Patriarchate when asked about their views; a group who spoke out in favor of more 
significant restrictions than what the Synod put in place; and a small but vocal minority who 
adopted opinions in line with conspiracy theories which proliferated at this time, such as the 
vaccine microchip theory. These groups correspond to traditionalist, liberal, and fundamentalist 
positions, respectively (Stoeckl 2016). Quotes representing the personal views of some members 
of the Synod and other influential clergy members have been selected for inclusion in this 
section. 
 
5.1.C.a. Traditionalist Positions 
                                                          
33 This is a reference to the February 2017 arrest of Archdeacon Giorgi Mamaladze, who was accused of plotting to 
poison a high-ranking member of the Church using cyanide. The target of the plot was presumed to be Patriarch Ilia 
II, but it was later revealed that the alleged target was actually the Patriarch’s secretary, Shorena Tetruashvili. 
Mamaladze was sentenced to nine years in prison. External observers have noted several inconsistencies in the 
government’s case against the priest. Mamaladze, who was the deputy head of the Patriarchate’s department of asset 
management, had allegedly written a letter to the Patriarch pointing out various financial irregularities in the 
management of several businesses owned by the Church (JAMNews Tbilisi 2017). This case is notable because it 
precipitated a significant rupture among the clergy, marked by acrimonious public quarreling in a manner that was 
previously uncommon (Kadagidze 2019). 
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 The majority of public comments from clergy members were supportive of the positions 
of the Patriarchate and the Holy Synod. Priests demonstrated their support through various 
rhetorical appeals to authority, including references to the past and, in particular, the Church’s 
historical experiences with epidemic illness; to the Synod’s independent decision-making 
authority (Unaniants 2020a); and the importance of time-honored liturgical tradition and faith in 
times of crisis. Metropolitan Andrea Gvazava, for example, drafted a statement reminding the 
population to stay calm and follow the advice of doctors, relaying that the Garejeli fathers left 
their isolated monastery to serve the nation during the spread of the bubonic plague in Georgia 
(Tabula 2020a).34 In this case, the historical account of the country’s past experiences with 
epidemic illness was used to argue that the Church is composed of socially responsible actors 
working for the benefit of the population, a tone which they continually strived for despite 
contradicting the recommendations of public health officials.  
Although the exact rules were in flux and being continually negotiated over the first 
several weeks of the state of emergency, many clergy members made a conscious effort to 
demonstrate compliance with whichever regulations the Church had deemed necessary. In their 
view, implementing these measures did not indicate a lack of belief in the purity of communion 
but was done to assuage the fears of outsiders. In this way, the clergy endeavored to demonstrate 
that they were upholding their side of the compromise with the State. Metropolitan Davit 
Makharadze summarized the crux of this approach in an April 2020 sermon: 
“Some say that by sharing [in communion], you may be putting others in harm’s way. Do 
not believe it. That standing together, side by side, can be contagious and harmful to 
others. Do not believe it. It is impossible for anything bad to happen during the service 
[…] We have no reason for anxiety and do not want to quarrel. Everything in 
moderation. There is no shame in staying at home. We will come and share [the 
communion] but we will follow all the other rules so that others are not troubled” 
(Tabula 2020i) 
As Easter approached, priests and parishes performed a kind of agreeable dissent towards 
government regulations not only in interviews and sermons but also in visual media. Technically 
speaking, gatherings of over 10, and later, over 3, were still banned and carried significant fines. 
However, rather than hiding their behavior, many Church officials opted for greater 
transparency. They began posting pictures and videos on Facebook of liturgies. They featured 
assistants and attendees wearing masks, parishioners studiously maintaining distance from one 
another, and services conducted at outdoor altars. These videos were, in some cases, shot 
                                                          
34 The Garejeli fathers referred to in this letter are monks from the Davit Gareja monastic complex, which was 
founded in the 6th century CE.  
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professionally to specifically emphasize the orderly manner in which the liturgy was being carried 
out. The Patriarchate was also clearly hoping to avoid the appearance of taking advantage of the 
conditions of the compromise: when Archpriest Shalva Kekelia, who conducts services at a large 
church in the Vake district of Tbilisi, told the press that he was preparing a space to hold the 
Easter liturgy that would allow for up to 2000 attendees while maintaining social distance, Andria 
Jaghmaidze publicly warned him against doing so, and the mass gathering did not continue as 
planned (NetGazeti 2020a; OC Media 2020a). 
 
Figure A: Still from a video of Easter Services posted on the official Facebook page of the Zugdidi-Tsaishi 















Figure B: Photo of a churchyard in the early evening on the day before Easter, posted on the official Facebook 
page of the Batumi and Lazeti Eparchy. 
https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2250262535268537&set=pcb.2250262588601865   
 
 
5.1.C.b. Critical Views from Clergy Members 
 A small number of clergy members were critical of both the Holy Synod’s decisions and 
the government’s reluctance to challenge or limit services. Although he did not openly challenge 
the theological underpinnings of the Synod’s decisions, Metropolitan Grigol Berbichashvili of 
Poti was the most cautious bishop in the Church in the management of his own eparchy. He 
elected to hold Easter services without parishioners, citing the need to maintain social distance 
(Unaniants 2020d). He also stated that he could not call on believers to break the law unless the 
law in question was indeed a “purposeful rebellion before God” (Tabula 2020j). The logic 
underpinning this view runs counter to both the tone and contents of what many other members 
of the GOC expressed: Metropolitan Grigol held that the State’s efforts to limit Church 
attendance were not excessive or punitive towards religion, but fully warranted and that it was 
the Church’s responsibility to the nation to be as compliant as possible. These sentiments were 
visible in the critiques from other lower-ranking clergy members as well, such as Deacon 
Alexandre Galdava, the head priest of the St. Michael the Archangel Church in Tbilisi (Tabula 
2020l), Metropolitan Saba Intskirveli, the bishop of the Eparchy of North America and Canada 
(Novosti - Gruzija 2020a), and Archpriest Tamaz Lomidze, in Germany. Archpriest Ilia 
Chighladze, who works in the United Kingdom, attributed the intransigence of many Church 
officials to inadequate theological training and argued that “fanaticism and fundamentalism” 
have increased significantly in the GOC since independence (Tabula 2020h).   
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Groups of critical clergy members drafted two open letters during this period. The first, 
published on March 25th in response to a Statement of the Patriarchate, argued that the Church 
was reading the rules on communion in an overly simplistic manner and that the shared spoon 
was one of several theologically acceptable modes of giving the host to believers. These priests 
and theologians argued that this position also threatened to insult other Orthodox Churches: 
“If restricting attendance at church services is ‘unjustified and a crime against God,’ as 
stated [in the statement of the Patriarchate], this means that the vast majority of the 
Orthodox Church in the world is committing unjust crimes, which is a serious charge 
against the body of the Orthodox Church” (Radio Tavisupleba 2020) 
In an April 17th statement, many of the same clergy members announced that they would 
temporarily stop from taking an active part in religious life for Easter because “whoever refrains 
from worshiping today due to the epidemic is not betraying Christ, but instead tries to perform a 
spiritual liturgy in the service of [their] fellow neighbor in the given situation” (NetGazeti 2020b). 
Several theologians and clergy members also wrote statements justifying staying at home and 
avoiding services for the EMC (now called the “Social Justice Center”), a left-wing Tbilisi-based 
NGO (EMC 2020a). In all of these statements, the signatory clergy members and theologians 
argued for the position that not participating in church life out of fear of the virus or desire to 
protect others was not a sign of deficient faith but rather a demonstration of Christian love for 
one’s neighbor and community. Interestingly, the majority of these clergy members were located 
outside of Georgia and are either serving the Church or studying in the United States, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and elsewhere. Many of them were also relatively young 
and had received theological training abroad. 
 
5.1.C.c. Conspiracy Theories: 
A vocal minority of priests and bishops used the pulpit to share their own versions of 
conspiracy theories which proliferated globally during this period. The four major theories that 
gained traction among members of the Church were the ideas that the virus was purposely 
developed for satanic ends; that vaccines (which were, at the time, still undeveloped) were 
dangerous and would kill people; that vaccines would lead to mass microchipping of the 
population; and that anti-Church actors were behind the state of emergency and had potentially 
even fabricated the illness entirely (or severely overstated its danger) to engender compliance in 
the population (Ratiani 2020). The common feature of these conspiratorial frameworks is a belief 
in global forces fighting directly against the Church or in which the Church is the sole actor that 
recognizes the threats posed by these forces, an ontology that allows clergy members to present 
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themselves as defenders of the faith. Metropolitan Iob of the Ruisi-Urbnisi Eparchy, for 
example, was quoted in a newspaper claiming that emergency funding that Georgia was to 
receive from the IMF and the EU to assist with the government’s response to the coronavirus 
was, in reality, distributed with the explicit aim of fighting against the Church (Unaniants 2020e; 
JAMNews Tbilisi 2020g). Metropolitan Ioseb (Kikvadze) claimed during a sermon that the virus 
was “obviously man-made” and that it was spread to facilitate the development of digital 
currencies, which would lead to hacking (Tabula 2020f).35 In the same sermon, he stated that the 
fact that Orthodox community leaders were under pressure to close churches, as other 
denominations had, was evidence that “in two to three years, humanity will cease to exist” 
(Tabula 2020e). Both Archpriest Saba Chikaidze and Archpriest Davit Isakadze claimed that 
vaccines were being developed and promoted to reduce the global population to only one billion 
people (Tabula 2020m; Ratiani 2020).36 The anti-Church forces accused of acting in the shadows 
include freemasons, Bill Gates, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
World Bank (Ratiani 2020). 
 
5.2 Analysis 
Amidst this selection of views, several themes emerge that may be considered the positions of 
the Church. First, the Church defends its decision to keep services open to the public and to 
continue using the single communion spoon primarily through religious liberty arguments. This 
                                                          
35 Both millenarian and some more mainstream actors in the Orthodox Churches of Georgia, Greece, and Russia 
have protested against various forms of digitization in the past, such as the introduction of individual identification 
numbers, national identity cards containing chips, credit cards, and digital currencies (Lomsadze 2013; Kishkovsky 
2011). Suslov referred to this tendency in the context of the ROC as “digital anxiety” and attributed its emergence to 
the Church’s anxiety that they cannot control what is consumed on the internet (Suslov 2016). The clearest present 
expression of this anxiety is the adoption of the widespread microchip conspiracy theory relating to the Coronavirus 
vaccine. The Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of Moldova, for example, even shared the microchip theory from 
the pulpit in the Spring of 2020 (Necsutu 2020b), as did some of the fathers at Mount Athos in Greece. Anxieties 
surrounding digitization and, in particular, state-led digitization appear to be motivated by the belief that centralized 
systems of managing personal data may simplify forms of discrimination against Christians, one of the early warning 
signs of the coming of the Antichrist and apocalypse (Knorre and Murashova 2021). These views are not new and 
are presumed to have spread through networks of Old Calendarists and Greek Orthodox into the Soviet Union as 
early as the 1980s and 90s (Pachenko 2017).  
36 In this project, I elect to view conspiracy theories from hierarchs as genuine expressions of their opinions and 
beliefs. Many of the individuals who espoused these views are also included in a list of Church members who are 
known to have shared explicitly pro-Russian views in the past (Buziashvili et al. 2021, 13–16). The fact that some 
clergy members who are more aligned with pro-Russian political views are also more susceptible to conspiracy 
theories is not surprising and does not necessarily need to be understood as a sign of purposeful disinformation. The 
ROC has historically had a particularly strong strain of fundamentalist and eschatologically-oriented thought over 
the past 120 years, in particular (Hagemeister 2018). These eschatological views in the post-Soviet era are associated 
primarily with the writings of certain cult figures, like Seraphim Rose, Archimandrite Rafail Karelin, and Sergei 
Nilus (Interviewee 4 2020). 
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can be explained by a union that was brokered between the traditionalist and fundamentalist 
poles of the Church. Finally, the Church expressed frustration and a sense of being embattled, 
arguing that journalists were waging a campaign against them.  
 
5.2.A. Religious Liberties  
A common thread that is visible in the vast majority of communications from the 
Church and its representatives over this period is the central importance that they place on 
religious liberty. However, the notion of religious liberty espoused by the Patriarchate and the 
majority of the clergy members may be understood as functioning at two levels. The first 
dimension is a conception of religious freedom rooted in the individual right to experience the 
divine, which, in this case, fundamentally privileged the rights of the individual Orthodox 
churchgoer over the remainder of the population. The second, which is more relevant to the 
upper echelons of the Church, was a statement of religious freedom for the Church as an 
institution – a request for space and time to maneuver and weigh options in a context that 
otherwise required rapid action and clear messaging. The debates over the communion spoon 
and the freedom to gather may be understood as expressions of the Church’s positions brought 
to light these two dimensions of religious freedom as understood by the Orthodox Church.  
The eucharist, in combination with other sacraments, is the cornerstone of the Orthodox 
Christian faith. Stopping or limiting access to gatherings posed challenges that were not unique 
to the Orthodox Church in Georgia, and these challenges were widely discussed in Orthodox 
and, indeed, all other religious communities around the globe. One idea that was repeated 
frequently by Church representatives throughout this period was the notion that, for believers, 
“spiritual nourishment is as important as carnal food.” The Patriarch repeatedly made statements 
to this effect (Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020f), as did his spokesperson 
Andria Jaghmaidze, several hierarchs (Tabula 2020k), and even one of the theologians whom I 
interviewed, Levan Abashidze (Abashidze 2020). To frame this in terms that became widely used 
during coronavirus era: in the view of the Church, communion is an essential service for 
believers.  
Following this thread literally, the State limiting access to the sacraments, even in minor 
ways, was therefore as unacceptable to much of the Church hierarchy as categorically preventing 
the population from going to supermarkets or pharmacies would be. The Church mediates the 
relationship of the believer to the divine, and it was not, in the view of the Patriarchate, the place 
of the State to determine the most intimate aspects of this mediation process. More conservative 
44 
 
hierarchs expressed that the prospects of closing churches or holding holiday services without 
believers were “unimaginable” to them. One of the more telling rhetorical strategies used during 
this period was comparisons of those requesting that Churches be closed to the anti-religious 
agitators of the Soviet era or early anti-Christian persecution:  
 “Closing the church was something unprecedented, yes? Only the Bolsheviks have done 
that, and that was in the early days of the Bolsheviks. To close churches on Sunday… it’s 
something, you know, persecution like in the early days of Christianity, to tell a 
community that they cannot come together and pray. If you know Christian history, well, 
you know that it would be something ridiculous.” (Abashidze 2020) 
Here, Abashidze evokes two of the most acutely traumatic experiences in Church history and 
compares the prospect of Churches temporarily closing for public health reasons to them, clearly 
indicating that some Church figures feel embattled. The comparison to the Soviet Union may 
seem at first to be hyperbolic, but sanitary standards were utilized in a somewhat punitive 
manner by anti-religious agitators in the USSR. Mitrofanova relayed how some “Corona-
dissidents”37 in the ROC openly compared the experience of being surveilled during COVID to 
anti-religious campaigns in the Soviet era as well. Some priests actually shared how sanitary 
checks and measures were used in a punitive manner by militsia, who could force priests to close 
Churches and wash icons with cologne and other cleaning substances at will (Mitrofanova 2021). 
The sanitary issue is also connected to communion. Soviet promotion of the idea that Orthodox 
communion, in particular, was uniquely unsanitary and worthy of disgust has some striking 
parallels to the Protestant demonization of the Catholic belief in the actual presence of Christ in 
the Eucharist. While it is outside of the scope of this project to determine the extent to which 
sanitary checks were utilized in anti-religious campaigns in the Georgian SSR, Church officials 
are responding defensively to the discursive redrawing of their rituals as unsanitary and, 
therefore, uncivilized (Goshadze 2020). 
Archbishop Nikoloz Pachuashvili went so far as to state that “We cannot ban believers 
from coming to services. Even if we said such a thing, true believers would never accept it” 
(Unaniants 2020a) (emphasis mine). This phrasing, which implies that not attending church 
services was a sign of inadequate or false belief, was not condoned or promoted by the Patriarch 
or the Synod. As was discussed above, they repeated that those who were uncomfortable should 
stay at home. However, the Patriarchate did not forbid bishops from expressing these types of 
views publicly, which placed believers in the uncomfortable position of measuring their own 
                                                          
37 In the Russian context, corona-dissidents are those who disagreed with or objected to Patriarch Kirill’s 
theological justification of stay-at-home orders.  
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faith against their desire to follow the law and to heed the advice of public health authorities. As 
Tamara Grdzelidze stated in our interview, “the whole responsibility was put onto the people” 
(Grdzelidze 2020). Government figures and Church officials presented this compromise as being 
motivated by an optimistic view of the personal and social responsibility of the population of 
Georgia. However, the numerous pleas of public health officials and orchestrated personal visits 
to the Patriarchate from various members of the government indicate that that the compromise 
was deeply contentious. This is likely why many Church officials endeavored to perform 
compliance even as they technically broke the law.  
The second form of religious liberty promoted by the Church, in this case, is a kind of 
institutional-level room for maneuver. This could be understood as deriving from individual 
religious liberties. The Patriarchate insisted on the right to a monopoly over the mediation of the 
relationship between the believer and the divine and refused to modify the rituals of this 
mediation despite significant external pressures, in the view of some, specifically as a means of 
asserting this right. The structure of the Church is relevant to this discussion. In Eastern 
Orthodoxy, there are two separate but interrelated principles of akribeia and oikonomia. The 
former refers to exactitude and strictness in observance of the laws of the Church, while the 
latter is the exercise of flexibility and leniency (Grdzelidze 2004). One of the main roles of 
bishops and the Holy Synod in the life and pastoral care of the Church is to tighten or loosen the 
laws at various times and to determine the appropriate balance of these principles through 
careful deliberation (Gurchiani 2017b; Schembri 2015, 127–29; Orsy 1982). Adapting the 
communion ritual, as was done in most Eastern Orthodox churches around the world, would be 
an expression of oikonomia – a liberalization or modification undertaken in the interests of saving 
the Church. 
This was not the conclusion that the Synod came to, however, in their deliberations, and 
the reason why this occurred in the Georgian case, unlike in most other Orthodox churches, is 
related to the ideological composition of the Holy Synod and the views of its constituent 
members. In Levan Abashidze’s view, the Church endeavors to maintain a wide ideological tent: 
“In our church, one priest can tell you that something should be done this way, another 
priest can tell you another way. You can say it is freer, or you could say that it is more 
chaotic. But there are no strict orders... That’s important to understand, that our Church 
is, in a way, quite liberal. There are many priests who are critical towards the Patriarchate 
and there are no administrative consequences” (Abashidze 2020) 
This “liberalism” has been challenged and tested several times within the past thirty years, and in 
the past five, in particular, by a spate of accusations of personal impropriety leveled amongst the 
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clergy.38 In several cases, the Synod and Patriarchate have elected to defrock priests who acted 
in a manner that they deemed unacceptable. In my discussion with Abashidze, however, we were 
speaking more about disagreements over issues of canonical understanding and the actual 
practice of Church life rather than the interpersonal dimension of relationships between various 
clergy members. In this case, there were dominant voices among the upper hierarchs who were 
reluctant to change liturgical practice at all and who expressed offense at the notion of outsiders 
questioning the Church’s authority on these issues. As early as March 3rd, Metropolitan Antoni of 
Van and Bagdati said in a televised interview: “The Church is treated like this: there is a shepherd 
and there are sheep. Now, the sheep are teaching the shepherd what to do, where to graze, 
which pastures to go to […] We [the clergy] will regulate the relationship between the Church 
and the believers” (Tabula 2020c). Perhaps the best articulation of the positions of the Synod is 
that they did not enforce decisions. They did not order that all churches must stay open, nor did 
they categorically prevent individual priests from abstaining from distributing the eucharist or 
modifying its mode of distribution their own parishes. They also did not, however, provide a 
theologically approved or recommended means of modifying the communion. In practice, each 
bishop and priest did as he saw fit, within some boundaries. That is, the Church was arguing 
both for the right of the flock to follow the shepherd but also for the right of each shepherd to 
lead his flock without external regulation.  
5.2.B Traditionalists Making Space for Fundamentalism 
Although the notion of an institution desiring autonomy over areas that it considers to 
be its domain is understandable, one question that follows from this discussion is: why was the 
Church unwilling or unable to form a coherent position on these issues? One potential answer is 
polarization within the Synod. In the Georgian Orthodox Church, the specific pressures of the 
coronavirus revealed that hierarchs who hold views that may be described as fundamentalist occupy several 
seats in the Synod. The Patriarchate, representing a traditionalist, but not fundamentalist, viewpoint, wanted to 
avoid alienating the fundamentalists.  
In his analysis of fundamentalism in Orthodoxy, theologian Cyril Hovorun argues that, 
while the underlying principles of fundamentalism are similar across religious communities, the 
ways in which it is expressed differ across faiths and time. In the Orthodox context, he identifies 
the “cult of spiritual authorities,” the unquestioning veneration of Church Fathers, and ritualism 
                                                          
38 Liberalism is placed in quotation marks in this case because Abashidze was not referring to liberalism as a 
political philosophy but more as an abstract notion of freedom of thought and action within the institution. 
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as the primary expressions of contemporary fundamentalism (Hovorun 2020). The first refers to 
gerontocratic tendencies in churches, which may be abused by Church elders. Excessive 
veneration of Church Fathers occurs when clergy treat these figures39 as absolute authorities 
without adequate understanding of their historical contexts. Meanwhile, ritualism takes the form 
of extreme focus on details of liturgical practice, to the extent that any modification is decried as 
heresy and, potentially, grounds for schism. In Hovorun’s understanding, these fundamentalist 
challenges mounted from within are typically a response to external social pressures and a sense 
of insecurity. In his analyses of the responses of the Orthodox Church in the Russian and 
Ukrainian contexts to the pandemic, Hovorun identifies what he describes as “corona 
fundamentalism.” In Georgia, “corona fundamentalism” is marked by extreme ritualism. Despite 
there being no canonical basis for the insistence on the use of a shared communion spoon, a fact 
which was discussed by both the more liberal and pro-Patriarchate theologians whom I spoke 
with (Grdzelidze 2020; Abashidze 2020), there was a sense that modifying the ritual was 
unacceptable because it is a part of the traditional liturgical culture. In essence, the crux of the 
Church’s argument against distributing the host in a manner that would be safer from an 
epidemiological perspective was an appeal to “millennial tradition” (Patriarchate of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church 2020a). 
One religious studies scholar whom I interviewed argued that the Patriarchate and Synod 
actually utilized this fundamentalist ritualism to justify their intransigence and lack of willingness 
to consider changes to the communion ritual or the rights to gather: 
“Fundamentalist thought became very vivid during the time of Corona. What I mean is 
that these thoughts were popular among priests before, but, you know, we never heard it 
from officials and high-level bishops. They were more marginal. But in the corona times, 
they used such teachings to legitimize their views that we should never close churches, 
because this would mean that the Antichrist will come, which is a sign of the end times.  
This Orthodox tradition was based on very controversial teachings […] not on 
normative teachings.” (Interviewee 4 2020) 
The argument that the Church may be using the doctrines of fundamentalist thinkers to 
obfuscate or avoid accountability for unpopular positions was not universally accepted, however. 
Abashidze pinpoints this reluctance as being rooted in response to the public and, in particular, 
                                                          
39 Church Fathers are influential theologians, particularly from the early era of Christianity. Catholics believe that 
the patristic period ended after John of Damascus (675-749 CE), while for the Orthodox, it continues to this day. 
Much of the intellectual work of theology is about consulting and comparing the writings of these venerated 
theologians to find areas of consensus between them, which become the dogmas of the Church.  
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the threat of schism. He recounted past issues with changing church calendars or modifying the 
fasts even slightly, stating: 
“People are very conscious. People who don’t even understand the calendar are very 
aware when you try to change something. It’s the same with the single spoon. For me – I 
am an Orthodox Christian. I am a theologian. I understand that if you have, instead of a 
single spoon, each brings their own, or something else, that there is no canonical 
problem. But it is very difficult to explain to everybody. Of course, there will be some 
reforms which are necessary, which are timely, but it is very difficult, because every time, 
there are some segments of the Church which are going schismatic, too. For instance, 
there are seven or eight small schismatic Orthodox churches which broke away because 
of some small issues, and very often these issues are so ridiculous.” (Abashidze 2020) 
In this context, the Synod’s partial embrace of fundamentalist ideas may be understood as an 
effort to maintain the unity of the Church in an increasingly polarized environment. The threat 
of schism would, most likely, be particularly salient to a Church facing the prospect of losing two 
major canonical territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and which has seen the formation of a 
number of small schismatic churches by former clergy members (Crego 2014, 147). 
The intransigent public, on whose behalf the Church claimed to be acting, is also visible 
in statements like Pachuashvili’s about “true believers.” This is undergirded by a veiled threat 
towards the government that interrupting services could have prompted even more dissenting 
behavior, such as protests in response to the perceived persecution of faithful Christians. 
Theologian Levan Abashidze expressed a similar sentiment:  
“I don’t think that it would have been better, or much better, if the government had a 
more strict policy, say, ‘now we are doing a lockdown and everybody should obey’, and 
so forth. I don’t think that it would be better because, in that case, there would be much 
more conflict. Many, many people, not only churchgoers but, I think, the wider public, 
would be unhappy with that. And this would include some radicalized groups.” 
(Abashidze 2020) 
What both of these statements allude to is the existence of groups of radicalized individuals who 
claim to support the Church. Many of these groups have personal relationships with charismatic 
fundamentalist clergy members, which is clear because they have been called on in the past to 
protest, notably at public events concerning the LGBT community. The threat of deploying 
violent groups that are not technically accountable to the Church in the case that they fail to 
achieve desired goals at the institutional level is a form of hybrid negotiation or engagement on 
the part of the hierarchy.  
 
5.2.C Anti-Church “Propaganda” 
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 Finally, it is worth discussing which groups of society the Church highlights as the source 
of their perceived persecution and where they understand the locus of the conflict to be. The 
contours of a post-secular conflict are visible in the criticisms of the church, in that the threat 
seems to emanate not from a single institution, but rather an amalgamation of ideas espoused by 
individuals in the media, civil society organizations, the government, and even in the more 
progressive wing of the Church itself. The first level that should be discussed in this case is that 
of the Patriarchate. In Statements of the Patriarchate and interviews with Andria Jaghmaidze, the 
“media” is blamed for waging what they interpret as a campaign targeted against them. This 
appears to be rooted in frustrations with outsiders discussing what the Church wants to present 
as internal issues or questions. The religious studies scholar whom I spoke with argued that 
online media in Georgia has, indeed, become something of a secularizing force in the country: 
“Media, and especially online media, has made a huge contribution to deconstructing the 
taboos around religious topics. Online media [outlets] that write about religion and 
church-related topics are not popular, but they have contributed to critical thinking. I 
would say that I believe the media also has some influence on the secularization process. 
I think that if we want to start research on secularization, we should look at the media, 
because many people express their secular views there. The internet is a freer space. 
Church-State relations were known about by scholars and experts, but among the wider 
public, it was not discussed. Even this controversial financial support […] People didn’t 
know about it.” (Interviewee 4 2020) 
They also noted, however, that while the media has contributed to the normalization of secular 
viewpoints, more open discussions of Church-State relations, and also to the criticism of the 
wealth that the Church has amassed from its relationship with the State, there is also a tendency 
to turn stories about the Church into a “show” (Interview 01). This tendency was clearly visible 
in the coverage of this case. The more fundamentalist wing of the Church, which did receive 
disproportionate coverage from media outlets, openly claimed that international money was 
being directed to Georgia to fund anti-Church propaganda. While the Patriarchate did not make 
such statements, their positions were, again, not contradictory to this view, and they dismissively 












6. The Liberal Critique from Theologians 
 
6.1 “Secular Moderns” and Habermas’ Liberal Religion 
In an opinion blog for the Religious Studies department of Utrecht University, Mariam 
Goshadze argues that the locus of the conflict over the communion spoon was rooted in the 
differing ontologies of two groups in Georgian society – the Orthodox Church and their 
supporters, and a group that she refers to as both “liberals” and “secular moderns.” In her 
analysis, the “secular modern” segment of society problematized the use of the communion 
spoon in a way that charted the Church and its believers as “uncivilized.” As tensions rose, the 
“secular moderns” framed the corporeal and embodied aspects of worship as unsanitary, 
barbaric, and, in the context of the pandemic where germs can kill, immoral (Goshadze 2020). 
Interestingly Goshadze’s “secular moderns” encompass, as was discussed in the previous 
chapter, many clergy members and representatives of the community of theologians who played 
an essential role in this case. The liberal religious response is the focus of this chapter. 
The critical side of this discussion is populated by a broad coalition – from political 
opposition members and academics to theologians and reformist clergy members. This cross-
section speaks to an ideological cleavage in Georgian society itself. While many claim that 
Georgian political parties are based on influential or appealing personalities rather than coherent 
ideological platforms (DRI and GYLA 2018), this does not mean that there are no such 
cleavages amongst the electorate. Opinions on the appropriate role of the Church in public life 
appear to be one important litmus test of political values in contemporary Georgia. In his study 
of 2016 pre-election survey results, Wheatley identifies the clusters of orientations at the 
extremities of this cleavage:  
“At one pole of this dimension are those who want to protect the Georgian economy 
from foreign ownership, believe that the GOC should play a major role in politics, are 
intolerant of gay rights, and have a relatively positive view of Russia – and Stalin – and a 
correspondingly negative view of the West. At the other pole are those who are more 
liberal in matters of gay rights, are more critical of the GOC, are pro-Western, and 
generally more tolerant of influences from abroad.” 
 
Wheatley finds that supporters of the former set of values are likelier to be older women who 
possess a technical education. In contrast, the latter set is likelier to be younger, male, and in 
possession of an education that equips them better for globalization (Wheatley 2020, 15–17). 
While the population (or, at least, the media and intelligentsia) is continually debating the role of 
the Church, the particularly novel element, in this case, was that a core aspect of the Orthodox 
faith – communion and attendance at the liturgy – became the site of conflict between the 
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ideological camps. The presentation of a divided front amongst the clergy, whether strategic or 
not, opened up an opportunity for criticism from within and demonstrated that the Church is 
not immune to these cleavages.  
Both theologians interviewed for this project discussed the need for some reform in 
Church-State relations, although they differed in where they lay the onus of blame for the 
conflict-prone present. Abashidze believes that politicians try to curry the Church’s favor for 
their own ends to excess (Abashidze 2020), while Grdzelidze criticized both the lack of 
awareness of some lawmakers in these matters and the Church’s intransigence. It is more 
accurate to refer to the latter group, represented here by Grdzelidze, as supporters of liberal 
public religion. This group argues that a reform of the Church is necessary if the institution is to 
exist productively in contemporary society, in line with Habermas’ statement that only after a 
period of “hermeneutic self-reflection” can religions be public. Issues like LGBT and minority 
rights, immigration, and the powers that should be extended to the Church are the main public 
flashpoints in the relationship between the triad of Church, State, and public. Questions over the 
Church’s role as a moral arbiter and political actor can be partially solved, in the view of “secular 
moderns” by the Church establishing epistemic stances towards other religions, secular society, 
secular knowledge sources, and a dedication to egalitarianism (Habermas 2006, 14). This camp 
rejects the acceptability of a traditionalist Church that operates by means of exceptions. These 
theologians are taking part in a kind of Habermasian critical self-reflection through engagement 
with the Georgian Christian tradition and what they understand to be constructive criticism of 
the Church. 
 
6.2. Critical Theologians 
 Theologians, like priests, were called upon for their opinions frequently by both the 
media and NGOs during this period. In addition to interview data, this section is based on 40 
quotes and written commentaries found in news sources articles written by theologians for the 
Social Justice Center (formerly called the EMC). These all came from 18 different critical 
theologians. This chapter highlights this cohort because they argue specifically from within the 
Orthodox tradition in defense of a liberal way of engaging with the world. These positions spring 
primarily from two sources. The first is based on disagreements with the Church’s interpretation 
of doctrine, which many of these theologians claim lacks contextual understanding or scriptural 
basis. The second is more externally and geopolitically oriented. They view the Church’s 
traditionalist stance, which triggers further desecularization, as incompatible with what they 
understand to be European or Western norms. As a group, these are highly educated scholars 
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who often speak several languages, have pursued education abroad, and occupy a somewhat 
privileged position in Georgian society. They generally fall into Wheatley’s second category and 
openly support Georgia’s integration into the West. They take positions that may be 
characterized as liberal in the ideological field of Orthodoxy, meaning that they support 
participating in interfaith dialogues and promoting the unity of the Orthodox Church. Generally, 
they also support distancing the GOC from the ROC rhetorically and symbolically.40 
 Virtually all of the comments from theologians gathered for this project were somewhat 
critical of the Synod’s decision on the communion ritual. In our interview, Tamara Grdzelidze 
challenged the compromise: 
“The problem with this is that there isn’t a proper understanding or interpretation of what is 
‘tradition’. Tradition is not about using a church item. That’s not tradition in its primary sense. 
Tradition is an uninterrupted teaching that we, the Orthodox, claim that we possess from the 
times of Jesus Christ through the apostles and until now. This is the tradition: an uninterrupted 
teaching of the Church. items are a separate thing. In all countries, church items have been a 
matter of local rituals, local traditions. These rituals become a local tradition after being used for 
years or, in our case, centuries. But that’s a different tradition. These ritual-related traditions are 
completely different from the church teaching, kerygma, as the Greeks call it. Church items cannot 
belong to the tradition of Christian teaching. Yes, the chalice and spoon are special items, but it's 
different. It's not the same as kerygma. So, there is a lack of clarity over what the Christian 
tradition is in reality. The lack of clarity creates this confusion. Had the Church acknowledged 
that under the secular age, with a strong sense of separated spheres, we should not be confusing 
kerygma with local tradition for rituals, there would not have happened confusion over the spoon. 
The Church must take seriously the current political climate of democracy and constitutional 
governance and comply with the overall legislation for the sake of its own flock, society in 
general, the State.” (Grdzelidze 2020) 
 
In the view of this critical school of theologians, there is a connection between the failure to 
distinguish between different semantic fields of tradition and the failure to accept secular 
modernity and the neutrality of the Georgian government. Others echoed similar views. 
Theologian Zurab Jashi criticized the Church’s intransigence over the communion by arguing 
that it threatened to transform faith into “superstition inherent in magical rituals.” Jashi calls 
kerygma – the dogma and ancient tradition of theological thought – the “treasure” of Georgian 
Orthodoxy and argues that appropriately following this “treasure” would never lead to action 
that could harm society (Jashi 2020). Shota Kintsurashvili argued that the Synod’s decision was 
not grounded in any “educational, canonical, or dogmatic issue”, but in an obsession with a flat 
notion of tradition caused by a lack of knowledge and poor theological education. In an 
argument that echoes Zaal Andronikashvili’s thesis (Chapter 4), Kintsurashvili attributes the lack 
                                                          
40 An issue that typifies this stance is the debate over recognizing the Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of 
Ukraine. Liberal priests like Irakli Jinjolava, with around thirty theologians, drafted a letter supporting the new 
Patriarch of the OCU. They stated that the logic behind doing so was to isolate the ROC from the rest of 
Orthodoxy and promote unity in the faith (Jinjolava 2019; Ukrinform 2019).  
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of religious literacy in the clergy to the Russian and Soviet “occupations” of Georgia, which 
interrupted the Church’s lineage (Kintsurashvili 2020). Members of this critical group argue from 
within Orthodoxy that important elements of tradition are mishandled or not consulted at all by 
the current Church hierarchy.   
 Theologians were divided over whether they viewed the Church’s position as a pastoral 
or a political issue, or both. Politically-oriented critiques of the Church-State agreement tend to 
come from theologians who regard the Church’s present hierarchy with deep pessimism. Much 
of their frustration was actually directed towards the State, because they view the expansive 
orientation of the Church – its desecularizing drive – as a foregone conclusion of its traditionalist 
stance. Perhaps the most extreme representative of this group is Basil Kobakhidze, the former 
press secretary of the GOC, who was defrocked in 2005 over disagreements with the Patriarch. 
In a YouTube video in early April, quoted in Ekho Kavkaza, he stated:  
“Conducting a dialogue with the Patriarchate and the Patriarch is senseless. You can 
present arguments from a medical, state, societal, or even theological point of view. They 
have their own logic, they live in their own world, they have their own God, who is an 
evil being that needs human sacrifice like, for example, Moloch. It is not Jesus Christ or 
the Holy Trinity” (Unaniants 2020b).  
 
Giorgi Tiginashvili accused the Church of “sabotag[ing]” the government’s anti-disease efforts 
for financial gain. “We see that the Church views society as a market [or] bazaar commodity and 
is trying to, through bargaining with the authorities, receive far more benefits, financial resources, 
and spheres of influence than it has had before” (Novosti - Gruzija 2020b). Several others, 
including Beka Mindiashvili, Gocha Barnov, and Mirian Gamrekelashvili, argued that negotiation 
with the Church was impossible and that the situation demanded a more forceful assertion of 
authority on the part of the State (Tabula 2020g; Gamrekelashvili 2020; Unaniants 2020c).  
 Although this brief analysis has not done justice to the diversity of views from critical 
theologians, this chapter endeavors to roughly sketch the contours of their views on the GOC as 
reflected in the present case. Much like the analysis of the GOC itself from Chapter 5, this 
section may be overly elite or intelligentsia-oriented, but it, nonetheless, accentuates the dynamic 











7. Discussion of Results and Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I have argued that COVID-19 showed the Georgian Orthodox 
Church to be a traditionalist institution due to their tendencies to privilege Orthodoxy over other 
religions, to challenge the validity of secular knowledge, and to articulate the exercise of religion 
in terms of human rights, even during a state of emergency. I have also investigated the reasons 
behind these stances and argue that it is due primarily to internal divisions within the Church and 
an agreement between the traditionalist center and fundamentalist wing of the Synod, which was 
emboldened in this episode. Secondly, this thesis discussed how critical theologians and clergy 
members answered the Church’s political statements and rhetorical techniques. These individuals 
represent a liberal, or reformist, response to the Easter Agreement from within the Orthodox 
tradition.  
 
7.1 Impact on the General Public  
 After analyzing the anatomy of this debate, it is natural to question how this episode 
affected the general public. In terms of health, the feared “Church cluster” did not materialize 
after Easter gatherings. The Ministry of Health in Georgia attributed this success to its 
intensified restrictions over the holiday weekend, which severely curbed attendance at services 
(“Measures Implemented by the Government of Georgia against Coronavirus” 2020). The 
Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
published a wealth of data on church attendance and attitudes towards the Church-State 
agreement based on surveys carried out from April through June 2020. A survey from the week 
after Easter found that only 4% of respondents reported attending services, while 41% had in 
the year before (CRRC 2020a). The same question asked in an NDI study in June showed that 
10% of the respondents had attended services (CRRC 2020g). Interestingly, respondents of both 
Armenian Apostolic and Catholic faith also reported going to Church for Easter in 2020 in this 
survey despite official announcements from the leadership of both communities that services 
would be suspended nationwide (Appendix II). This data underscores how official positions, 
while significant, do not necessarily reflect the complex realities on the ground.  
Low attendance numbers and the lack of outbreaks following Easter do not mean that 
this episode had no impact on the population. A wealth of medical literature has demonstrated 
that active participation in religious communities, rather than belief itself, is generally correlated 
with positive public health outcomes (Milstein, Palitsky, and Cuevas 2020). Studies also show 
that, in faith communities, religious leaders can play a crucial role in promoting healthy choices 
among believers (Harmon et al. 2016). While the potential damage of religious leaders openly 
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sharing false information about the virus is difficult to measure and falls outside of the purview 
of this project, one can assume that believers do not simply ignore their otherwise trusted 
religious authorities when they speak about health from the pulpit. Indeed, NDI survey data 
found that a plurality of Georgian believers of all faiths report trusting information that their 
religious leader shares with them about the coronavirus (Appendix II). In their pursuit to justify 
potentially high-risk faith-based behaviors, religious leaders of a more traditionalist or 
fundamentalist bent are likely to question or refute scientific knowledge. They support these 
challenges with pseudoscientific claims that the mainstream medical community has rejected. 
This behavior undermines the authority of public health officials and has deleterious effects on 
their messaging campaigns (Zalcberg and Zalcberg-Block 2021).  
The majority of Church hierarchs did not express fundamentalist viewpoints, and public 
health authorities in Georgia took great pains to avoid singling out or alienating Orthodox 
believers. However, it is still reasonable to assume that receiving these mixed messages from 
trusted sources may have caused some individuals to take the threat of the virus less seriously or 
engage in riskier behaviors. This effect may also extend to vaccine hesitancy in Georgia, as the 
Church has not prevented its hierarchs from spreading misinformation about vaccines (Ratiani 
2020). 
Interestingly, CRRC and NDI studies show that most of the population agreed with the 
policies imposed by public health authorities throughout this period, with approval ratings for 
masking indoors, evening curfews, closing cemeteries, and driving bans ranging from 75-95% 
(CRRC 2020a). This tracks fairly logically with previous findings that most Georgians tend to 
self-identify as Orthodox when asked, and place great symbolic importance in the Church, even 
if their rates of attendance and participation in Church life are comparably low (Charles 2009). In 
waves of surveys carried out between April and June, over half of the population reported 
believing that the Orthodox Church managed COVID well.41 However, the decision to continue 
using the Communion spoon was a more divisive point: 30% of the respondents agreed that it 
should be used, 43% disagreed, and 23% did not know how they felt. Of these respondents, 
those who did not claim any religion were the most critical (88% disagreeing), followed by 
                                                          
41 The waves of the CRRC surveys about the Coronavirus asked respondents to rate the “performance” of the 
Orthodox Church in response to the coronavirus on a periodic basis between late April (the week after Easter) and 
mid-June (following the end of the State of Emergency). In every dataset, between 64 and 75% of respondents 
consistently agreed that the Church performed either “well” or “very well.” The percentage of the public who 
negatively assessed the Church’s performance ranged between 14 and 6%. Overall, the assessment became 




members of the Armenian Apostolic Church (67%) and then Georgian Orthodox believers 
(43%). (CRRC 2020a). Therefore, one can surmise that the most significant division was over the 
Church’s defense of the Communion spoon. 
 
7.2 The International Dimension  
Another element of this case that drew significant interest from scholars of Orthodoxy 
was how the broader community varied in their management of these challenges. Following the 
2018 Schism between the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople over the 
status of the Church in Ukraine, the Orthodox world has been in disarray. The GOC is an 
interesting case to analyze within the broader community because it tends to take a more 
isolationist position in global Orthodoxy, abstaining from participation in most international 
dialogues and refusing to either recognize or disassociate with the newly-constituted Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine.42 It became clear official policies varied widely based on the specific tenor 
of Church-State relations in the country, the ideological bent of each Church’s hierarchy, and the 
severity of the epidemiological restrictions in place. In Greece, for example, the government 
surprised many by taking a zero-tolerance policy towards holding services, even banning small 
groups of priests from performing the liturgy without the flock. For most Church leaders, 
compliance was the norm: both the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople and Patriarch Kirill 
of the ROC held Easter services with no attendees and requested that believers stay at home.43 
The church that most closely mirrors the GOC is the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which kept 
services open and also saw severe limitations on attendance at services due to practical barriers 
established by the government.44 Globally speaking, the GOC was unique in their lack of an 
official policy towards the Communion spoon, as most other Patriarchates established a set of 





                                                          
42 This silence is likely caused by fears that if the GOC were to recognize the OCU, the ROC would retaliate by 
officially supporting the independence of the breakaway Orthodox Church in Abkhazia/Abkhazeti, thus shrinking 
the GOC’s canonical boundaries (Chapidze and Umland 2019).  
43 Policies in Russia, which were brokered between local Bishops and regional administrators, varied widely. 
44 The Bulgarian case also, interestingly, mirrors Georgia’s trajectory with the virus more generally – both countries 
managed to stave off the first severe outbreak until Fall 2020, at which point uncontrolled spread began. 
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Figure C: Official Policies of Eastern Orthodox Churches towards COVID 
 
Complete ban on services -Church of Greece (Koutantou 2020) 
Services held but attended 
only by priests 
-Serbian Orthodox Church 
-Romanian Orthodox Church (Kajosevic 2020) 
-Church of Cyprus (Kathimerini Cyprus 2020) 
-Orthodox Church of Ukraine45 (Bellamy 2020) 
-North Macedonia (Jevropejskaja Pravda 2020) 
-Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Heintz 2020) 
-Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem 
-Greek Orthodox Church of Antioch 
-Greek Orthodox Church of Alexandria 
-Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia46  
Services held outdoors, 
open to public 
-Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova (Necsutu 2020a) 
-Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate 
(Bellamy 2020) 
Varied based on regional 
requirements 
-Russian Orthodox Church (Mitrofanova 2021) 
Services held indoors, 
limited attendance 
-Polish Orthodox Church (Sulkowski and Ignatowski 2020) 
Services held indoors, open 
to unrestricted public 
attendance 
-Georgian Orthodox Church 
-Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Tsolova 2020) 
 
The second noteworthy international development in this case was the fertile soil that 
COVID provided for the public emergence of fundamentalist thought. Orthodox 
fundamentalism tends to manifest formally as anti-ecumenism and isolationism. However, the 
sheer similarity of the conspiracy theories put forward by clergy in completely different linguistic 
contexts and Orthodox Churches would indicate that these individuals are imbibing information 
from a shared constellation of sources and adapting it slightly to their local setting. These sources 
that fundamentalist clergy are reading, be they social media groups or analog newsletters, have 
contributed to a trans-national ideological foment that furnishes rather specific eschatological 
                                                          
45 In Ukraine, two separate Orthodox churches that claim to represent the majority of believers in the country: the 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The former is 
recognized as autocephalous by the Ecumenical Patriarchate as of 2018, while the latter is a sub-unit of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Ukraine is split in this chart because the OCU urged believers to stay at home and held services 
in private. Meanwhile, the metropolitan of the UOC-MP interpreted the laws differently, claiming that conducting 
services in churchyards was acceptable. 
46 Both Czechia and Slovakia had lockdowns at this time. They therefore only offered individual spiritual services to 
believers (“Nařízení č. 9 v Souvislosti s Nouzovým Stavem a Mimořádným Opatřením Vlády ČR [Regulation No. 9 




narratives and turns. Finding the locus and genealogy of this strain of thinking would be an 
essential exercise for those interested in understanding modern Orthodoxy, its various 
intellectual currents, and locating individual Churches within the religion’s global ideological 
firmament.  
Upon completing this study, the fundamentalist-traditionalist-liberal categorization for 
religious institutions also stands out as a fruitful distinction that opens new avenues for 
comparative work outside of established denominational and historical boundaries. While 
comparing communities in the post-Soviet region is undoubtedly a useful exercise, using the 
ideological categorization as a vector may yield novel and valuable results. For example, some 
Jewish communities in Israel and Catholic communities in Central Europe, which may also be 
characterized as traditionalists, mounted similar challenges to their governments to lift public 
health restrictions or establish exceptions to the state of emergency. Perhaps analyzing the 
interaction between states and traditionalist religious communities globally will help leaders 
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Appendix I: Case Timeline  
Date Event 
December 29th, 2019 Wuhan City government in Hubei Province, China begins tracking the 
outbreak of a novel coronavirus (“Hubei Timeline” n.d.) 
January 27th, 2020 Georgian airports begin checking passengers for coronavirus 
(JAMNews Tbilisi 2020a) 
January 19th, 2020 Georgia pauses flights with China (JAMNews Tbilisi 2020b) 
February 26th, 2020 The first coronavirus patient, a Georgian citizen returning from Iran, is 
confirmed in Georgia (JAMNews Tbilisi 2020c) 
February 29th, 2020 Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church releases a statement 
announcing that they will not change the methods by which 
communion is shared with believers (Patriarchate of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church 2020a) 
March 1st, 2020  Patriarch Ilia II addresses the topic of the coronavirus in a sermon, 
sharing a vision (Tabula 2020b) 
March 2-4th, 2020 The government suspends attendance at all educational facilities, 
Georgia begins repatriation of citizens from abroad and preparing 
quarantine zones, disinfection of public spaces, public gatherings 
banned (“Measures Implemented by the Government of Georgia 
against Coronavirus” 2020, 8) 
March 11th, 2020 WHO officially declares that COVID-19 is a global pandemic 
(Adhanom 2020) 
March 12th, 2020 The Georgian Ministry of Health reports 24 confirmed cases of 
coronavirus in the country; the Georgian government asks the 
population to work from home (JAMNews Tbilisi 2020d) 
March 17th, 2020 Orthodox Church organizes blessing of the streets of Tbilisi to combat 
the virus (Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020e) 
March 19th, 2020 Statement of the Patriarchate on disagreements among the clergy 
(Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020b) 
March 20th, 2020 Statement of the Holy Synod released (Holy Synod of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church 2020) 
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March 21st, 2020 Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia announces the beginning of the state 
of emergency, including restrictions on gatherings of over ten 
individuals 
Despite the announcement of the state of emergency, Orthodox 
Church services are held in the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity, and PM 
Gakharia meets with church officials to explain that the ban on 
meetings of 10+ people should not be “taken literally” by the Church 
(JAMNews Tbilisi 2020e) 
March 23rd, 2020 Bolnisi and Marneuli municipalities quarantined due to development of 
cluster (“Measures Implemented by the Government of Georgia 
against Coronavirus” 2020, 23) 
March 24th, 2020 A group of NGOs and lawyers publishes a letter requesting that the 
government create conditions to maximize religious liberty safely and 
also calling on religious communities, and the Orthodox Church, in 
particular, to not violate epidemiological measures (“Address to the 
Authorities of Georgia and Religious Organizations” 2020) 
March 25th, 2020 Statement of the Patriarchate in response to media criticism 
(Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church 2020d) 
March 30th, 2020 PM Giorgi Gakharia announces a nationwide curfew from 21:00 to 
6:00, which will extend from March 31st through April 21st (the day 
after Easter) 
Gatherings of more than three individuals are prohibited (JAMNews 
Tbilisi 2020f) 
April 4th, 2020 Georgia records first death from the novel coronavirus, a woman from 
the Marneuli/Bolnisi cluster. 
April 10th, 2020 Quarantine of Lentekhi municipality (“Measures Implemented by the 
Government of Georgia against Coronavirus” 2020, 23) 
April 12th, 2020 Partial quarantine in Kobuleti municipality; 
Beginning of Holy Week 
April 13th, 2020 Quarantine of Khidiskuri village in the Khashuri municipality 
April 13-19th, 2020 An increase in the daily number of new cases (up from single digits to 
the 30s) prompting health professionals to warn the population that 
the first wave could begin in the following weeks, asking them to stay 
home from Easter festivities (Civil GE 2020a) 
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April 14th, 2020 A priest from Tbilisi’s St. John the Theologian church and a security 
guard for the Patriarchate are both confirmed to have coronavirus 
(JAMNews Tbilisi 2020h) 
April 17th, 2020 All travel by car banned to prevent holiday clusters and visiting 
cemeteries prohibited;  
Statement from the Patriarchate clarifying that ban on travel by car 
does not apply to clergy members;  
Mirtagi Asadov, the Chairman of the Supreme Religious 
Administration of Georgia’s Muslims, was arrested and held for 
questioning at the State Security Service in connection with the 
protests in Marneuli and Bolnisi and a televised interview in which he 
compared the position and rights of Muslims in Georgia unfavorably 
to that of Orthodox Christians (EMC 2020b; JAMNews Tbilisi 2020i) 
13 clergy members and 16 theologians draft an open letter refusing to 
take part in liturgical life (Interpress News Georgia 2020b; NetGazeti 
2020b) 
April 19–20th, 2020 Easter Night and Easter Sunday, attendees spend all night in 
churchyards across the country to avoid arrest for breaking curfew. 
April 22nd, 2020 Hundreds of ethnic Azerbaijani villagers in the Marneuli district 
destroy their crops in protest against the quarantine regime due to 
economic distress and frustration with local authorities (Avaliani 2020) 
April 27th, 2020 Ban on car travel ends 
May 11th, 2020 Tbilisi reopens in a limited manner, but the curfew remains in place. 
May 17th, 2020 Day of Family Purity observed in the Church; City streets are blessed. 
May 22nd, 2020 End of state of emergency 
Parliament passes amendment to the Forest Code of Georgia, 
permitting Orthodox Churches to gain ownership of forest areas of up 









Appendix II. CRRC and NDI Studies 
NDI Public Attitudes in Georgia, June 2020 Based randomized telephonic interviews, 1550 
respondents 
II.1 Attendance of Easter services in Church by denomination 
 
II.2 Claim that faith protects believers from COVID by denomination 
 




II.4 Reasons for why Georgia has a lower COVID spread and mortality rates, broken 












Participant Information Sheet: COVID-19 and the Georgian Orthodox Church 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask the 
researcher if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take 
some time to decide whether or not you wish to take part: 
 
This study is about responses to the COVID-19 epidemic. I am conducting interviews to gain a 
more nuanced understanding of the role that the Georgian Orthodox Church has played in 
addressing the current crisis. I hope to draw conclusions about the state of Church-State 
relations in Georgia based on information and views gathered from these interviews.  
 
Interviews should take approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary, and you may decide at any time that you wish to stop.  
 
Any personal identifying information, such as names and place of residence, divulged over 
the course of this interview will be anonymized in transcripts. An ID number will be used in 
the place of your name and only I, the researcher, will have access to this information.  
 
You may elect to be anonymous or named in the final thesis. If you choose to remain 
anonymous, confidentiality will be respected unless there are compelling and legitimate 
reasons for this to be breached. If this was the case, I would inform you of any decisions that 
might limit your confidentiality. Please note that full confidentiality may not be guaranteed; 
due to the limited size of the participant sample. 
 
Data collected in these interviews will be used in the production of my Master’s Thesis, which 
is being written under faculty supervision from both Ilia State University (Tbilisi, Georgia) and 
the University of Glasgow (Glasgow, The United Kingdom). All digital files created during this 
project, including recordings and transcripts, will be saved in password-protected and encrypted files 
for 10 years. 
 




Contacts for Further Information  
Researcher: Rose Hinman, 2409554H@student.gla.ac.uk; roseisabellahinman@gmail.com  
Supervisor: Federica Prina, federica.prina@glasgow.ac.uk  
This project has been considered and approved by the School Ethics Forum of the School of Social 
and Political Science of the University of Glasgow.  
 
If you have any concerns regarding the conduct of this research project, you can contact the Ethics 































Appendix IV. Interview Questions 
 
This is a sampling of the questions that I asked interviewees. In some cases, I asked them specifically about topics 
that they had written on in the past as they related to this case.  
General Responses: Were you surprised by the statements of Church officials during this 
period? What about government officials? 
Church-State Relations:  
How would you characterize the changes in Church-Stare relations since independence?  
Why do you think that the government was unwilling to contradict the Church or ban, for 
example, the use of shared spoons? 
Do you believe that the concept of symphonia is relevant in the contemporary Georgian political 
context? Does this ideal influence Church-State relations? 
Church’s Theology and Public Relations: How do you understand the Church’s definition of 
tradition? To what extent can liturgical tradition be adapted? 
I noticed a number of priests publicly announced that they were dissenting and not holding 
services. Would you say that it is normal for priests to be so transparent about their differences 
of opinion? Is the Church’s leniency towards public discord strategic or a matter of a lack of 
control? 
Might the reluctance to issue top-down orders have been an effort to safeguard ecclesial economy 
(oikonomia) of bishops?  
I saw a number of eschatological discourses emerge during this period. Where do you 
understand the origins of these ideas to be? Would you characterize them as more marginal or 
more mainstream? 
Do you see any changes in how the Church communicates with the public over the past several 
years? 
International Dimension: To what extent you think the various Orthodox Churches consulted 
with one another? Do you think that there was any kind inter-Orthodox discussion about how to 
manage the practical barriers to worship? 
 
